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Abstract 
 
Vilnius and Klaipėda territorial questions were the main obstacle for deeper Baltic 
cooperation during interwar period. In 1934 all three Baltic states created a union called 
Baltic Entente. From this moment, Latvian and Estonian diplomats had to re-define their 
position in relation to Klaipėda and Vilnius question. The long-lasting conflicts played an 
important role in Estonian and Latvian foreign policy not only developing relations with 
Lithuania, but also in a broader regional context. The main aim is to find out how territorial 
questions determined Estonia’s and Latvia’s foreign policy. This thesis finds that the 
territorial problems were treated differently by Latvia and Estonia. Vilnius question was the 
only problem envisioned in the treaty of the Baltic Entente. Klaipėda was not defined as 
specific problem. However, Estonia’s and Latvia’s behaviour depended on their own 
interests. Latvians provided help through diplomatic channels whereas Estonians were much 
restrained. Both countries held on strict neutrality regarding Vilnius conflict. However, 
Latvia was actively involved in mediation attempts while they believed that conflict between 
Poland and Lithuania could cause German aggression. There was not found any proves of 
Germany and Poland direct influence on Lithuania through Latvia and Estonia. There was 
mistrust that prevailed among three Baltic states. Hence, specific problems seriously 
paralyzed any attempts of deepening Baltic Entente.  
 
Keywords: Specific problems, Vilnius, Klaipeda, Baltic Entente, Baltic states, Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Vilnius and Klaipėda regions’ territorial disputes1 were the main problems of Lithuanian 
foreign policy during interwar period. The city of Lithuanian grand dukes, Vilnius was 
declared the capital of Lithuania in 1918. However, two years later Poland broke the treaty 
of Suvalkai and occupied Vilnius2. Poland and Lithuania were the only neighbours in Europe 
that did not establish diplomatic relations at that time. It seriously aggravated security 
situation in the region. In the 1920s, there were attempts to create a defence union, which 
would encompass all countries between Germany and the Soviet Union in order to form a 
cordon sanitaire3 against these two countries.  Due to Vilnius conflict, it never came into 
being. The situation slightly turned to positive direction in the 1930s when Nazis came into 
power and there were some signs indicating that the conflict can be solved. Polish and 
Lithuanian foreign ministers met a couple of times secretly. At the end discussions were not 
fruitful.  
Similar conflict emerged in Klaipėda region. Lithuania acquired this piece of land in 1923. 
Even though Lithuania controlled the region, they had to comply with very strict Klaipėda 
Convention,4 which created serious obstacles to fully integrate the region. Germany opposed 
to any nationalistic step of the Lithuanian government. These were one of first attempts to 
threaten to the sovereignty of Lithuania. The situation rapidly worsened in 1933 when Nazis 
came into power. Nazis applied economic and political pressure. It became too difficult to 
constrain the growth of Nazism in the region. Eventually, notorious appeasement policy was 
                                                          
1 Synonyms used in the research: specific questions, specific problems, territorial problems, Vilnius and 
Klaipėda questions. 
2 The treaty was signed in the town of Suwałki (Suvalkai) on 7th October. 1920. The clauses calling for territorial 
negotiation and an end to military actions soon were broken by Poland. Polish general L. Żeligowski, acting 
under secret orders from J. Piłsudski, pretended to disobey stand-down orders from the Polish military 
command and marched to Vilnius. The city was taken on 9th October 1920. 
3 In English: Buffer zone. 
4 International agreement between Lithuania and the countries of the Conference of Ambassadors (United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan) signed in Paris on May 8, 1924. According to the Convention, Klaipėda 
Region (Memel Territory) became an autonomous region under unconditional sovereignty of Lithuania. 
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also noticeable in the case of Klaipėda. In 1939, the land was peacefully handed over to 
Germany. 
The neighbouring countries were concerned about Vilnius and Klaipėda questions. Primarily, 
Latvia and Estonia were interested in solving these territorial problems. Three Baltic states 
were natural allies due to their geopolitical situation, but Latvia and Estonia had to be 
cautious because Klaipėda and Vilnius questions touched upon interests of Poland and 
Germany. 1934 was the pivotal year to the status quo that existed since 1920s. For 
Lithuanians this year marked the end of manoeuvring policy between the main regional 
powers, when Germany and Poland signed non-aggression pact.  Lithuanians automatically 
swung towards their natural allies – Latvia and Estonia. Three Baltic states created union 
called Baltic Entente. The foreign minister of Lithuania D. Zaunius was ready to make 
concessions regarding territorial conflicts. 
Relevance of the topic and chronological boundaries. Vilnius and Klaipėda questions are 
well researched problems. There are several studies published regarding domestic situation 
of these two regions. Several historians have written articles about the main events in 
Klaipėda and Vilnius from the perspective of Latvia and Estonia. However, there is a lack of 
consistent and thorough evaluation of Latvian and Estonian positions on these two issues 
during 1934-1938. Historians concentrate more on crucial events such as occupation of 
Vilnius in 19205 or Klaipėda revolt staged by Lithuanians in 19236. In 1934-1938 legal status 
of those two regions did not change – Vilnius still belonged to Poland and Lithuania had 
restricted sovereignty over Klaipėda. But there was one important change in the foreign 
policy of the Baltic states. In 1934 was created the Baltic Entente. A strong union was 
important for every single of three Baltic states. Klaipėda and Vilnius questions had a big 
impact on the cooperation between Baltic states. Latvia and Estonia had to find the ways how 
to deal with Klaipėda and Vilnius so that the union could fully function and relationship with 
other important partners (Germany and Poland) would not deteriorate. In historiography, 
                                                          
5 E. Jēkabsons, Klaipēdas jautājums un Latvija 1923. gadā. Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls. 2002. Nr. 4. p. 
56 - 89.   
6 Ē. Jēkabsons Latvijos ir Lietuvos santykiai 1919 – 1921 metais. Lietuvos archyvai. 1999. Nr. 12. p. 96 - 114.   
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these issues are usually left out, because Latvia and Estonia publicly put those two conflicts 
together as being a matter of Lithuania [commonly used term “specific problems”].7 But the 
impact on the entire cooperation and bilateral relations of what it seems only Lithuania’s 
domestic problems should not be underestimated.  
There is still confusion in historiography regarding “specific problems”. Some historians 
claim that the Baltic states agreed only that Vilnius problem has the status of “specific 
problems”. Thus, Latvia and Estonia were automatically obliged to help Lithuania in the case 
of Klaipėda.8 Historian A. Kasparavičius directly opposed to Z. Butkus opinion that the only 
problem indicated in the treaty of the Baltic Entente was Vilnius. He claims that the definition 
“specific problems” was used in plural form [meaning there were at least two specific 
problems]. Lithuania also wished to consider as specific problem only Vilnius which would 
imply that both Latvia and Estonia had in mind Klaipėda region as specific problems too.9 
Others assume that, despite not mentioning Klaipėda as  specific problem, it had de facto the 
same status as Vilnius, because in reality Latvia and Estonia did not provide any help.10 The 
eyewitnesses of these events seemed to considered Klaipėda and Vilnius as two specific 
problems.11 This question contains legal importance. The Baltic treaty envisioned exclusion 
of mutual diplomatic and political assistance for specific questions. In other words, Latvia 
and Estonia (or Lithuania if Latvia and Estonia had specific problems) MUST have provided 
diplomatic and political assistance. 
By the end of 1938 the issues related with specific problems lost their relevance. At 
the beginning of 1939 Hitler forced Lithuania to give Klaipėda region “Heim ins Reich”12 
Meanwhile, Vilnius was given back to Lithuania a month later when the war broke out in 
1939 October.  
                                                          
7 Algimantas Kasparavičius. Lietuva 1938-1939 m.: neutraliteto iliuzijos. – Vilnius: Baltos lankos. – 2010, p.51 
8 Zenonas Butkus, Magnus Ilmjärv. Latvijos ir Estijos požiūris į Klaipėdos atplėšimą nuo Lietuvos 1939 metais, 
Lietuvos istorijos studijos, Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2009, p. 123. 
9 Algimantas Kasparavičius. Lietuva 1938-1939 m.: neutraliteto iliuzijos. – Vilnius: Baltos lankos. – 2010, 
p.82-83 
10 Ē. Jēkabsons, Klaipėda Europos dėmesio centre: 1939 metai. Žvilgsnis iš Latvijos, Klaipėda, 2013, p.169. 
11 D. Bukelevičiūtė. Vidurio Europos šalių požiūris į Keturių paktą ir jų konsolidacijos problemos 1933–1934 
metais, „Istorija“. Mokslo darbai. 86 tomas, 2012, Vilnius. P. 31. 
12 Back home to the Reich  
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Historiography. Baltic states’ historians have researched intensively political and 
diplomatic relations between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. E. Andersons’ works were 
important contribution to the Latvian historiography. In his view, since 1934 Lithuanians 
tried to approach Latvians. Political and moral help of Latvia was highly appreciated.13 E. 
Andersons gives a comprehensive review of strained German-Lithuanian relations and the 
role of Latvia in it. However, his conclusions were too strict, depicting Estonia the cause of 
Latvia’s problems. He did not create a full picture of Latvian diplomacy working actively on 
both sides (Polish and Lithuanian) in order to reach a consensus between these two countries. 
On the other hand, Andersons’ did not have this aim. He mainly concentrated on the broader 
aspect of Latvian-Lithuanian relations. In 1993 three Latvian historians I. Feldmanis, A. 
Stranga, M. Virsis published a study “Foreign Policy of Latvia and International situation 
(2nd half of the 1930s). Their work is valuable for a thorough presentation of events that 
happened on crucial days of March 1938, when Lithuania was compelled to accept Polish 
ultimatum. They wrote about huge expectations of V. Munters to make difference in Vilnius 
question and bring away both parties from war. They critically described his attempts to 
mediate between Lithuanians and Poles. The authors believed V.Munters was driven by his 
own ambitions and Estonians accused him of pretending to be protectors of all Baltic states.14  
This thesis will concentrate on different approach. It will argue that the main impetus for 
Munters’ mediation was his concerns about possible military actions of Germany in 
Klaipėda. Munters attempted to mediate between both parties a couple of times since creation 
of the Baltic Entente. Even if ambitions were important for V.Munters there should have 
been also other reasons for taking mediator’s role so many times by risking your own 
reputation. Another Latvian historian who wrote an article about V. Munters’ mediation plans 
is Ē. Jēkabsons. His article also contains V. Munters 1938 4th april report to Latvian envoys 
in foreign countries, which explains detailed V. Munters’ actions during the Polish-
Lithuanian border conflict.15 Ē. Jēkabsons outlined precisely the context of the Ultimatum. 
                                                          
13 E. Andersons, Latvijas vēsture 1920-1940 Ārpolitika I d. Stockholm 1982, p. 530. 
14 I. Feldmanis, A. Stranga, M. Virsis, Latvijas ārpolitika un starptautiskais stāvoklis: (30. gadu otrā puse), Rīga 
: Latvijas Ārpolitikas institūts, 1993. p.120. 
15Ē. Jēkabsons,  Latvijas ārlietu ministra Vilhelma Muntera starpniecības mēģinājums Polijas un Lietuvas 
konfliktā 1938. gada martā, Latvijas arhivi, 2008. 
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Such thorough assessment of Lithuanian foreign policy in the 1930s is still missing. 
So far, the best study of the “Baltic orientation” of Lithuanian foreign policy in the 2nd half 
of 1930s was written by A. Kasparavičius. He focuses on collective security issues in the 
Baltic states and gradual shift of the Baltic states from three states cooperation to neutrality. 
He depicted how Estonians were first to question collective security and they moved towards 
neutrality. A. Kasparavičius explained it through Estonia’s close ties with Scandinavian 
countries, failure of the League of Nations.16 A. Kasparavicius’ given explanation is correct 
but there was another important factor. Success of the Baltic Entente directly depended on 
(un)successful solution of the territorial questions. As there were more and more troubles 
around these questions, Estonians decided not to get entangled with it. It is not assessed the 
role of specific question to the whole Baltic cooperation. Even though a broader Baltic 
foreign policy from Lithuanian perspective is missing, a gap is partially filled with Z. Butkus 
and M. Ilmjärv’s article. The article primarily deals with 1939 German ultimatum to 
Lithuania. It also analysis late 1938 events and how the situation in Klaipėda escalated. 
However, the article does not encompass the period of constantly growing tension in 
Klaipėda when the foreign policy of Estonia was led by J. Seljamaa and F. Akel, therefore it 
is not really clear why did Estonia at first place became so sceptical, what was the role of 
Germany in it.17 The same applies to Ē. Jēkabsons’ article. It is dedicated more to the crucial 
events of Klaipėda in 1939 (as the title of the article suggests), giving less attention to the 
development of Latvian foreign policy in Klaipėda and the reasons why Latvia was one of 
the biggest supporters of Lithuania in Klaipėda. 18 Another article that directly addresses the 
issues of Klaipėda and gives a lot of information about the public policy of Latvia in Klaipėda 
is E. Gervetauskaite’s article. She analyses Lithuanian newspaper, Lithuanian public figures 
to show tremendous work of the Latvian consulate in support of Lithuania. This thesis will 
add to that and show the hidden side of the consulate work, namely its diplomatic exchange 
with the ministry of foreign affairs and formation of official position.19 
                                                          
16 A. Kasparavičius, Lietuva 1938-1939 m.: Neutralumo iliuzijos, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius. 2010. p. 47. 
17 Zenonas Butkus, Magnus Ilmjärv. Latvijos ir Estijos požiūris į Klaipėdos atplėšimą nuo Lietuvos 1939 
metais, Lietuvos istorijos studijos, Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2009 
18 Ē. Jēkabsons, Klaipėda Europos dėmesio centre: 1939 metai. Žvilgsnis iš Latvijos, Klaipėda, 2013. 
19 E. Gervetauskaitė Latvijos konsulatas Klaipėdoje 1920–1940 m. Istorija / History 2016, t. 101, Nr. 1, p. 89–
109 / Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 89–109, 2016. 
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Study focus: The main focus is the impact of territorial questions on Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian bilateral and multilateral relations in 1934-1938.The importance of these 
questions is sometimes downplayed by historians, because the treaty of the Baltic Entente 
signed in 1934 entitled [as it is sometimes believed] Latvia and Estonia not to take any 
action in this regard. But despite that, the long-lasting conflicts played an important role in 
Estonia’s and Latvia’s foreign policy not only in relation to Lithuania, but also in a broader 
regional context. Latvia and Estonia had to newly determine their attitude to Vilnius and 
Klaipėda question by signing the treaty of Baltic Entente or re-affirm their traditional 
policy. In one way or another, since Lithuania became officially an ally, bound by treaties, 
these questions could not be avoided in the Estonian and Latvian foreign policy. 
Research aim: The main research aim is to find out how territorial questions determined 
Estonia’s and Latvia’s foreign policy. From this aim derive further research aim.   
1. In order to find out the impact of territorial questions, one has to give a deeper 
explanation what was the legal status of both problems. Historians argue about the 
status of specific problems and there are at least a couple of contradicting theories. 
Through recreating thoroughly events before 1934 September 12th (signature of the 
treaty of Baltic Entente) I would contribute to the existing debate and give a new 
perspective of the specific problem. As the treaty envisioned it could have had huge 
importance of further behaviour of Latvia and Estonia in foreign affairs depending 
the question was considered as specific problem or not. 
2. The problem of specific questions was a monumental issue which lasted for years, 
therefore it would be difficult to expect crucial changes over a night. It is true the 
situation in these both regions throughout 1934-1938 did not change – Vilnius 
belonged to Poland and Klaipėda – to Lithuania. But it false to think that there was 
ONE Latvian and ONE Estonian position regarding specific problems. Different 
Estonian and Latvian diplomats had different visions and those visions often 
collided and changed even if from the legal point of view situation did not change. 
My aim would be to identify inner contradictions and agreements between Latvian 
and Estonian politicians how their positions evolved in order to give a full picture 
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of the development of Latvian and Estonian foreign policy regarding the specific 
questions. 
3. Poland and Germany had direct interest in Vilnius and Klaipėda, respectively. They 
also considered to be close partners of Latvia and Estonia. The situation of two 
Baltic states was difficult and required to find a good balance between two groups 
of interests. I will assess how Estonia and Latvia tackled with Polish and German 
pressure and their interests in the Baltics and whether it result any changes in 
foreign policy.  
4. Since 1934 the cooperation between Baltic States was brought to a new level. The 
Baltic Entente emerged as a new player on the international arena. The specific 
questions were the pivotal object of discussions before signing the Baltic Entente 
treaty on 12th September 1934 and beyond it. I will assess the impact of specific 
problems to the Baltic cooperation.  
 
Research questions: 
1. What were the main similarities and differences of Estonian and Latvian 
positions? The status of specific problems did not change in the period of 1934-
1938. However, separate diplomats and politicians pushed their own agenda 
forming pro-Baltic groups or the opposite, which led to changes of foreign policy of 
Latvia and Estonia. 
2. At what extent Latvian and Estonian foreign policy held on their legal 
obligation negotiated in the Baltic Entente treaty? After long discussions that 
lasted almost one-year, Baltic countries determined definition of specific problems 
but as the definition happened to be vague the question is left opened how they 
managed to implement their obligations in reality. 
3. What was the role of Germany and Poland steering Estonian and Latvian 
foreign policy? Territorial questions were not solved bilaterally. Estonia and Latvia 
happened to be the closest way to reach stubborn Lithuania since they were bond by 
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the Baltic Entente treaty. Latvia and Estonia had their own geopolitical vision and 
their own interests. 
4. How did Vilnius and Klaipėda problems affect Baltic states’ cooperation? The 
question of specific problems might have looked like it had been left behind, when 
three countries agreed to create Baltic Entente, but it actually always accompanied 
discussions that touched upon three Baltic states’ relations. 
Research methodology – Qualitative analysis will enable to evaluate the impact of the 
territorial question on Latvian and Estonian foreign policy and the Baltic cooperation. The 
research does not assess nor seek to explain the details regarding the Baltic cooperation, it is 
rather an effort to contribute to existing historiography. Secondly, when applying this 
method, other approaches of historians regarding “specific problems” presented in the earlier 
studies will be debated.  
The comparative research method was employed in order to emphasize differences 
between Latvia and Estonia’s positions. For that reason, archival material from both countries 
were studied, as well as, critically evaluated previous studies.  
The work pays attention at possible subjectivities and interests regarding such 
sensible topics as Vilnius and Klaipėda questions, therefore extreme positions will be 
contradicted with other sources. 
By analysing primary and secondary sources the researcher tried to present a consistent 
interpretation of Vilnius and Klaipėda conflicts in 1934-1938 from the Latvian and Estonian 
foreign policy perspective. Latvian and Estonian positions on Klaipėda and Vilnius questions 
are best reflected in historical sources. The most important sources for the research are stored 
in the Lithuanian Central State Archives (further LCVA, in Lithuanian Lietuvos Centrinis 
Valstybės Archyvas). One of the mostly used documents can be found in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs fond (F. 383). One should mention that Lithuania already in 1934 had 
suspicions negotiating with Estonia and Latvia. They thought that the third party (Poland and 
Germany) might have exerted pressure on them. Lithuania closely followed every visit of 
Estonian and Latvian officials to Poland. 20 As relationship were based on mistrust Lithuanian 
                                                          
20 LCVA 383.7.1575. p. 128 // LCVA 383.7.1587. p. 184 
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diplomats sometimes carelessly labelled Estonians and Latvians as pro-Polish or pro-
German. However, the documents reveal that Lithuania hoped for a more active engagement 
of Latvia and Estonia in the conflict as they considered them the closest allies. But 
expectations more and more diverged from the reality, in which the Baltic Entente started 
cracking. The documents show that Lithuanian diplomats were critical to Latvia and Estonia 
but despite their reluctance and ignorance of their problems (as Lithuanians believed) 
Lithuanians considered Latvia and Estonia as natural allies. This research also refers to 
plentiful documents of the Political department of the Latvian ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(F.2574), material of Latvian Diplomatic and Consular Representation Fond (F. 2575), and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fond (F.1313), which are stored in the Latvian State Historical 
Archive (further LVVA, in Latvian Latvijas Valsts Vēstures Arhīvs). Reports sent from the 
embassy of Latvia to Lithuania and Latvian General Consulate in Klaipėda to Riga 
contributed to a better understanding of Latvian state position.  These documents also unfold 
the fact that Latvia and Estonia often had different approaches to the specific problems. 
Latvia had to encourage Estonian politicians to support Lithuania politically in Klaipėda. 21 
The materials from the Latvian archive were helpful in the context of understanding Estonian 
position, which was represented by Lithuanian sources very bias (as political conjuncture of 
that time required). Latvian and Estonian diplomats coordinated closely their position in the 
first years after creation of the Baltic Entente. Although the documents from Estonian 
archives were not analyzed on the volume as Latvian and Lithuanian documents, Estonian 
National Archive’s material (further ERA, in Estonian Eesti Rahvusarhiiv) assisted to a better 
understanding of Polish and German role in Estonian foreign policy. Conversations of Polish 
and German diplomats with Estonian officials revealed that at first Estonia tried to balance 
their position neither showing support for Polish and Germany claims nor completely 
undermining Lithuanian claims.22 This trend was soon to be replaced by obedience of some 
Estonian officials.  
                                                          
21 LVVA 2575.8.36. p. 334-335. 
22 ERA.957.14.10. p. 110. 
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Published documents were also an important source to the research. Documents of 
1938 Lithuanian foreign policy reflect conversations held between Lithuanian envoy23 
P.Dailidė and Estonian officials show that Estonia in the late 1938 had a strict position  and 
encouraged Lithuania to find a solution to Klaipėda questions as fast as possible, otherwise 
it would bring threat to existence and hinder development.24 Historian Z. Butkus has 
composed a set of documents “The Idea and Practice of Unity of the Baltic States during 
1918–1940”. Collected documents from various archives, newspapers etc. encompass 
reports, telegrams, instructions between envoys and governments about the creation of Baltic 
Entente and its activities.25     
Limitations of the study –Due to lack of proficiency of Estonian language the work will be 
mainly based on primary sources and literature written in Lithuanian, Latvian, and English, 
which might not give full picture or simply weaken my arguments related with Estonian 
standpoint.  
 
  
                                                          
23 Official status of the representative coming from the Baltic states was an envoy or minister of diplomatic 
mission. Ambassadors were only exchanged between great powers. Eventually after the Second World War all 
diplomatic missions were upgraded their relations to the ambassadorial rank.  
24 Dokumentai, 1938: 1938 01 05-1938 12 31 / Lietuvos Respublikos užsienio reikalų ministerija, Lietuvos 
vyriausiojo archyvaro tarnyba, Vilniaus universiteto Tarptautinių santykių ir politikos mokslų institutas ; 
sudarytojai ir redaktoriai Tomas Remeikis, Rūta Kuncienė, Vilnius : Akademinė leidyba, 2012 
25 Baltijos valstybių vienybės idėja ir praktika 1918–1940 metais: dokumentų rinkinys / sudarė Z. Butkus. 
Vilnius, 2008. 
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CHAPTER 1.HOW MANY SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WERE 
THERE? 
Until this day historians are discussing what was actually meant behind the term “Specific 
problems.” Lithuanian historian Z. Butkus claims the Baltic states agreed only that Vilnius 
problem has the status of „specific problems “, thus Latvia and Estonia were automatically 
obliged to help Lithuania in the case of Klaipėda.26 Latvian historian Ē. Jēkabsons agrees 
with Z. Butkus and states: “Only Vilnius question was determined as specific problem in the 
secret declaration of the treaty. Despite that, Latvian representatives this status gave also to 
Klaipėda question, which is clear from all their reports.27 However, A. Kasparavičius has a 
different opinion and claims that there were two problems indicated. He based his opinion 
on several facts: he claims that definition “specific problems” was used in plural form and 
the fact that Lithuania wanted to consider as specific problem only Vilnius is a clear 
indication that existed two problems. This debate is important in order to make sense to 
Latvian and Estonian foreign policy after the Baltic Entente was created. In case one or both 
specific problems were not envisioned in the treaty it would be legally binding to provide 
diplomatic and mutual help28.  
Following chronological events of 1934 and using different archival material, this chapter 
unfolds what was debated between Latvians and Estonians and how did they perceive these 
two territorial problems on the eve of signing the Baltic Entente treaty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Zenonas Butkus, Magnus Ilmjärv. Latvijos ir Estijos požiūris į Klaipėdos atplėšimą nuo Lietuvos 1939 
metais, Lietuvos istorijos studijos, Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2009, p. 123. 
27 Ē. Jēkabsons, Klaipėda Europos dėmesio centre: 1939 m. Žvilgsnis iš Latvijos, p.169. 
28 First article of the Baltic Entente treaty. 
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1.1 Treaty of the Baltic Entente: one or two problems? 
 
The process of negotiations was carried out under big secrecy. The most dividing question 
in the negotiations was future status of Vilnius and Klaipėda. The question was also sensitive 
because it touched upon Polish and German interests. Eyewitnesses were also confused of 
what had been actually on 12th September decided on the specific problems. “Latvijas 
Kareivis” a Latvian newspaper announced: “Trusted sources said that only Vilnius question 
had been included in the agreement”.29 Politicians had a reason to hide the real decisions 
made in the meeting. If such commitments were undertaken it would suppose that Latvia and 
Estonia have to adjust their foreign policy according to Lithuania’s national security which 
might contradict third countries’ national interests. 
Until 1934 Latvian and Estonian foreign policy towards these questions could be described 
as stable and neutral. Neither Latvia nor Estonia wanted or had to resolve Lithuania’s 
problems. Both countries did not put any efforts in finding solutions that Lithuania had to 
find itself. At the beginning of 1934 one Latvian diplomat wrote in internal correspondence: 
“Vilnius have become a dogma for Lithuanians and if Latvia tried to settle the conflict it 
would only reach the opposite result”. According to the diplomat, the conflict was 
successfully exploited in internal political affairs. Thus, neither Latvia nor Estonia could 
provide help to resolve Klaipėda and Vilnius questions.30 In spite of that, both countries were 
eager to expand the cooperation. Latvia and Estonia were first to prolong Latvian-Estonian 
defence alliance on 17 February, which did not exclude possible participation of a third 
country. Conversations between ministers of foreign affairs of Latvia and Estonia disclosed 
the fact that this role was envisioned to Lithuania.31 In the eyes of Latvian envoy F. Cielēns 
Baltic union was the most important question of the Latvian foreign policy. He dreamt about 
defence union, though he understood concerns in Latvia. Under the circumstances of Poland 
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and Germany threats it would not be clever to join forces with Lithuania.32 Vice minister of 
Foreign affairs of Estonia H. Laretei was ready to support Lithuanians in cultural areas, but 
he stayed reserved in political affairs and gave an opportunity to Lithuanians themselves to 
show initiative.33  
It did not take long to that moment. Minister of foreign affairs of Lithuania D. Zaunius held 
a speech in Tallinn in honour of the Estonian independence. He expressed a wish to draw the 
Baltic states closer.  Latvian envoy to Lithuania L. Sēja understood the real D. Zaunius’ 
intentions. He was convinced that Lithuania simply got trapped in its “foreign policy 
jungles”.34 Vilnius question had already lost relevance on the highest level of international 
community, Poland and Soviet Union signed non-Aggression pact and the whole 
construction of Lithuanian foreign policy collapsed. L. Sēja felt that the timing was 
favourable to find a solution and that more people from the ruling party in Lithuania spoke 
out for a closer Baltic cooperation. The pressure came from the opposition too. It was 
suppressed, but they gradually became more vocal and tried to reconcile with Poland.  
After D. Zaunius gave first hints of possible cooperation soon he made an official statement. 
He handed over an aide mémoire 35 to the Latvian and Estonian governments. It contained 
some general directions towards cooperation. D. Zaunius did not mention in particular 
Vilnius and Klaipėda issues. He noted that: “Ideally members of this union should have a 
common understanding in all questions especially on those issues which touch upon political 
objectives of the members itself but in practice it would be hard to achieve [common 
understanding], therefore an exception should be done in particular questions”.36 Lithuania 
showed eagerness to cooperate, but without any tangible proposals. The first reactions 
coming from Latvia and Estonia were not satisfying Lithuanians. L. Sēja predicted that it 
would be hard for Lithuania to join the 17 February pact, while it had envisioned territorial 
                                                          
32 F. Cielēns’ secret report about Polish-Russian suggested declaration regarding Baltic states’ security 1934 02 
15 // LVVA. 2575.11.50. p. 194. 
33  Protocol of Latvian and Estonian foreign ministers’ meeting 1934 02 16-18 // LVVA 2574.3.3042 p.46. 
34 V. Ziverts’report regarding D. Zaunius speech in Tallinn 1934 03 01 // LVVA 2575.15.82. p. 294. 
35 An informal diplomatic message. 
36 Aide memoire of Lithuania to Latvia and Estonia // Lietuvos aidas. 1934 04 26 p.1 Access through internet: 
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integrity principle, though he advised not to be too much negative or reserved so Lithuanians 
would not drift towards Soviet Union even more.37 This argument of losing Lithuania from 
influence sphere played an important role. It was not only Lithuania that blamed other Baltic 
countries for serving other countries’ interests, but also Latvia and Estonia were certain that 
the Soviet Union had a tremendous influence on Lithuania. Latvia was ready to make 
concessions in order to minimize Soviet influence in Lithuania. 
The 25th April aide mémoire was soon discussed between Latvians and Estonians in Riga on 
the highest level. Both parties stated that the content of the aide mémoire was too declarative, 
general. They clearly saw contradictions in some of the points. Lithuania’s mentioned “vital 
interests” which were understood in relation to a third state but not as a question that touches 
all three Baltic states. But what if vital interests oppose two other state interests? Latvia and 
Estonia declared that they did not have these questions but Lithuania had Vilnius question of 
exactly this fashion and this might stall Latvia or Estonia’s vital interests. The conclusion 
was that a security agreement could not be signed due to this problem.38 In other words, 
Lithuania claimed that Vilnius question has to be solved only between Poland and Lithuania 
itself. However, Latvia and Estonia thought they might be dragged to this conflict because 
Lithuania dealing with this question in its own way may oppose to their interests. It was 
clearly stated that Vilnius question has to have the status of the specific problem.  
Both sides had to be ready for hard negotiations, because the very definition of specific 
problems was not clear and there was a lot of room for international law particularities. At 
first, even a defence union was not out of table. The amplitude of possible outcomes varied 
from creating a defence union to failure. One was clear - there would be no exceptions to 
Vilnius problem. In the negotiations D. Zaunius was flexible. He surprisingly proposed to 
Latvia and Estonia to decide themselves what they wanted to consider as specific problems. 
He expressed understanding that they [Latvians and Estonians] probably could not solidarize 
in one or another question, namely Vilnius or Klaipėda territorial disputes. D. Zaunius 
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preferred to find a solidary policy so at least Lithuania’s interests would not be harmed.39 
This was one of very few cases when Klaipėda was mentioned in the discussions and this 
issue was not raised by Estonians or Latvians.  Overall, aide mémoire was not well thought 
through or, on the contrary, D. Zaunius wanted to keep flexibility and showed readiness to 
step back where it was necessary. Estonian envoy K. Pusta believed it was a clever move of 
Lithuanians to strengthen their positions against Poland by pushing to accept article five and 
thus imputing on other Baltic states obligations.40 K. Pusta went probably too far with the 
conclusions, but it only proves how important was Poland’s role in creation of the Baltic 
Entente. At this stage, nobody excluded probability of defence union but it was very fast 
taken off the table when specific problems were discussed in details. 
Estonian politicians, as well as Latvian, did keep in touch with foreign governments 
to discuss about the current affairs. Lithuania did not take it well. Lithuanian diplomat P. 
Dailidė residing in Tallinn assumed that the postponement of negotiations gave a ground to 
believe that these are intrigues caused by Germany in Riga and Poland in Tallinn.41 The 
influence of Germany was probably exaggerated. L. Sēja had conversation with the German 
ambassador in Riga. In this conversation L. Sēja was more concerned about A. Rosenberg‘s  
Ostpolitik’s seriousness rather than Klaipėda issue. It did not seem that Germans would raise 
this question too.42 Latvian politician sensed the expansion of Nazi ideology and crawling 
danger which had reached Latvian borders. Estonia gave much more reasons to believe that 
its policy was affected by external powers, to be precise – by Poland. The fuss was caused 
by the visit of Estonian diplomats to Warsaw which overlapped with intensive negotiations. 
Lithuanian envoy to Germany reacted to this visit as a clear sign against the union.43 A 
feverish unionist Latvian envoy A. Bilmanis considered it as a restart of Polish-Estonian flirt. 
He believed it was an attempt from the Polish side to delay the process “by planting a seed 
in Estonian minds”.44 For many it was obvious that Estonian military staff influence had been 
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growing and aide mémoire went through general J. Laidoner’s hands which was sometimes 
called as a Polish-friendly politician. No doubt that the Polish government wanted to drag 
Estonians to their side. During the mentioned meeting Poles warned Estonians that they 
would be isolated with Latvians in case a union came into being. The official Warsaw 
expressed its concern that Lithuania could join the 17th February union and this would also 
implicate accession to the 1923 November defence union signed between Estonia and 
Latvia.45 Probably J. Beck went too far spreading his fears. It was impossible to join to the 
defence union without signing a new treaty. Thus, his claims did not have any legal ground. 
What neither Latvians nor Lithuania knew or did not want to believe was that some Estonian 
politicians in those meeting showed a high degree of diplomacy. In these conversations H. 
Laretei acted as a counterbalance. He diplomatically reminded his Polish counterparts, that 
they had been constantly reminding Lithuanians about the issues, but good relations between 
Baltic states and Poland would be positive for both sides.46 H. Laretei did not betray 
Lithuania’s interest nor had an intention to do that. The same message was transmitted by the 
minister of foreign affairs J. Seljamaa, who told to his Baltic partners that he was, by no 
means, against the union but the union should not harm relations with Poland and he was not 
ready to interfere in Vilnius and Klaipėda questions.47 Nevertheless, they created a bad image 
making these visits in the course of negotiations with Lithuania. Meanwhile, Latvia wanted 
to get in touch with Poland as well, but with intention to see if there was an opportunity for 
reconciliation. Latvians inquired if Poles would be ready to give some kind of compensations 
because of Vilnius and if they accepted mediation of a third party.48 It marked the first 
attempts to take an active role by solving the conflict. Overall, Poland attempted to exert 
influence, particularly on Estonia, but at this stage Estonia managed to control the balance 
between Polish and Lithuanian interests. We could even speculate that Estonians contributed 
to a more favourable position of J. Beck who was very sceptical to the Baltic Entente but 
later on seemed not to make any additional obstacles.     
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If the future status of Vilnius was intensively discussed topic, Klaipėda somehow was 
left in the background. It was mentioned before that neither Lithuania nor other Baltic states 
had a preconceived attitude, what were those specific problems. Maybe that was the reason 
why sometimes Klaipėda and Vilnius were lumped together but these were not equally 
treated problems. Latvian envoy to Poland J. Grosvalds said that in connection with risks to 
defend Lithuania independence and territorial sovereignty, he territory should be clearly 
defined. According to him, there were no questions about Vilnius, but also in relation to 
Klaipėda it should be taken certain precaution.49 This shows that they were aware about 
consequences of diplomatic/military aid to Lithuania and kept the question opened. They had 
no twisted imagination of Germany’s goodwill. Quite the opposite, on 7-8th May discussions 
between foreign affairs leaders of Estonia and Latvia they came to conclusion that German 
aggression against Klaipėda would be a danger not only to Lithuania but also to Latvia and 
Estonia. For that reason, they were interested that Lithuania would retain Klaipėda and this 
question would not hinder the cooperation.50 H. Laretei laid out his thoughts even more 
precise. Even though he criticized wrong policies of Lithuania carried out in Klaipėda, he 
conceded that the loss of Klaipėda would mean encirclement of German jeopardy. He 
believed that if Germany occupied Klaipėda then Poland would be pushed to take actions in 
the hinterland of Lithuania and they would lose independence totally. “Because of it, Latvia’s 
and Estonia’s duty would be to support Lithuania in the conflict with Germany” – said H. 
Laretei.51 V. Munters shared with H. Laretei the same thought. He was determined to support 
in every possible way Lithuania, because “legal ground was on their side”.52  It would be no 
proves to claim that Klaipėda’s question somehow created obstacles. On the contrary, 
Germany was far away from engaging in the question of Klaipėda as much as Poland showed 
its interest in Vilnius. Estonia and Latvia estimated Germany’s aggression to them as very 
probable and they saw Klaipėda’s occupation as crossing the Rubicon. Of course, this 
question was contestable and less pro-Lithuanian diplomats had a different opinion, but at 
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this certain point of time the main actors of Latvian and Estonian foreign policy such as V. 
Munters, J. Seljamaa and H. Laretei understood, even if selfishly, that the fall of Klaipėda 
might bring the same destiny to them.    
The main meeting heads of foreign policy took place in July. It was marked with a 
feverish wish from the Latvian and Estonian side that Lithuania joined the 17th February pact. 
This could have had secret intensions since V. Munters mentioned that the pact had been 
concluded to coordinate more foreign policy rather than cooperation of armed forces.53 It 
could be that Latvia and Estonia wanted to have more say to what was happening in 
Lithuania. J. Urbšys suspected that Permanent Council was exactly envisioned for this 
purpose. But as there was no clarity regarding specific questions, discussions came back to 
it. There was no major breakthrough made since 25th April aide mémoire. V. Munters 
referred again to Klaipėda as if it was not a specific problem, but with a potential to become 
one. He asked, whether a specific problem could emerge after the conclusion of treaty. J. 
Urbšys did not answer directly only to remind his contractors that he would wish two things: 
active solidarity in foreign policy and a passive solidarity in specific questions in a way that 
it would not harm Lithuanian interests. Any expression of solidarity on the treaty was too 
risky for Latvia and Estonia. For this reason, V. Munters was reluctant to mention specific 
question on the treaty but to define it in a separate document. Even though Lithuanians were 
not obtrusive, what they had been accustomed to do, they were determined to include third 
article about specific problems in the treaty in pursuit of Vilnius question revival. Latvians 
and Estonians wanted to keep away from loud statements but somehow to gain instruments 
of influence. Any appearance of Vilnius question on the treaty could have been misinterpret 
by Poland. H. Laretei did not hide his desire to have an impact over solution in Vilnius and 
he blamed Lithuanians having delayed collaboration by not allowing anyone to step in the 
conflict.54  
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 In the view of Lithuanians, the best definition of specific problem was: “Which with regard 
to this problem retains full freedom of action”.55 However, Lithuanians had to step back and 
a new minister of foreign affairs S. Lozoraitis proposed a new phrasing : “It is understood 
that the other two contracting parties will refrain from any action likely to harm the interests 
of the state in the face of such a problem, which, with regard to this problem, retains full 
freedom of action”.56 In other words it would put obligations on Latvia and Estonia and at 
the same time they would not have any reciprocal instruments of influence. This was against 
Latvia’s and Estonia’s interests to retain “free hands”. Mistrust was deeply rooted in 
Lithuania and they expected that Latvia and Estonia cannot be impartial.  Lithuania had 
always showed discontent with interfering in domestic affairs. Lithuanian envoy in Estonia 
expressed his disappointment that Estonians would always defend their policy orientation 
and mistakes of Poland would never open their eyes.57 The question of specific problems was 
not solved in the conference of Kaunas. Lithuania was asking for Latvian and Estonian 
political help in return giving nothing. About a month after, the question was still opened. 
Lithuanians persistently invited to a new conference, but V. Munters was curious to hear a 
new definition of specific problems. He wished to determine not only the meaning of specific 
problems but also exact specific problems so in the future there wouldn’t be any 
misunderstandings.58  
A new opportunity to finally solve the problems of specific questions opened on 29th 
August conference organized in Riga. Estonia and Latvia demanded such wording of specific 
problem that under certain circumstances they would have a right to express their opinion. 
Secondly both countries wanted to get guarantees that any other problems of this fashion 
would never come up.59 At the end, both sides made compromises. The third article was 
phrased: specific problems make an exception from the commitment made in the first 
                                                          
55 Original: Qui a l’egard de ce probleme conserve son entiere liberte d’action 
56 Original: il est bien entendu que les deux autres parties contractantes s'abstiendront de tout acte susceptible 
de nuire aux interets de l'etat se trouvant aux prises avec un tel probleme, qui a l'egard de ce probleme conserve 
son entiere liberte d'action. 
57 R. Liepiņš’ report on J. Beck’s visit to Tallinn 1934 07 26 // LVVA. 2575.8.36 p. 179. 
58 Report regarding Baltic union 1934 08 16 // LCVA. 383.7.1587, p.123. 
59 Baltijos valstybių vienybės idėja ir praktika 1918–1940 metais: dokumentų rinkinys / compiled Z. Butkus. 
Vilnius 2008 p. 510 
23 
 
article.60 Both sides agreed to comply by gaining no influence on the matter and putting on 
themselves no obligations to provide political or diplomatic help. An essential victory was 
achieved by Latvians and Estonians because the parties did conclude a secret declaration, to 
which Lithuanians objected. In this secret declaration, J. Seljamaa, V. Munters, and S. 
Lozoraitis with their signatures indicated that the only specific problem was Vilnius.61 
Even though both Vilnius, as well as Klaipėda, were mentioned in the context of 
specific problems, it is clear that Klaipėda region territory was never a subject of discussions 
and their status in the eyes of Estonian and Latvian politicians were different from the one 
agreed on Vilnius question. The usage of plural form goes back to the discussions’ stage 
when nobody could explain how these specific questions would be defined. Latvia and 
Estonia were concerned about Klaipėda becoming a problem in the future, but when 
Lithuania asked what would they consider as specific problems the discussions swung 
towards Vilnius question. Another strong argument for Klaipėda not being a specific problem 
is the fact that Latvia and Estonia had intentions to provide help to Lithuania in this matter. 
They seemed to understand that if Lithuania falls Latvia and Estonia would go down too.  
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CHAPTER 2. TWO PHASES OF ESTONIAN FOREIGN 
POLICIY 
2.1. Pragmatic Ministry of Foreign Affairs under J. Seljamaa  
 
Estonians have never showed a lot of enthusiasm to cooperate with Lithuanians. No 
exception was the period of J. Seljamaa as the head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1933-
1936). Nevertheless, he had pragmatic view in relation to Lithuania, which led to 
materialization of Baltic Entente in 1934. Their position was very clear what was related with 
Lithuania’s territorial questions– it is up to Lithuania how they would like to settle the 
conflicts. Meanwhile, Estonia would not undermine Lithuania’s positions and respect both 
sides of the conflicts. 
Despite J.Seljamaa’s very low interest to engage in the conflict, he managed to infuriate 
Lithuanians a couple of times with his statements in the Polish media. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Lithuania sent instruction to envoy P. Dailidė with the assignment to make remarks 
directly to J.Seljamaa regarding his expressed regret of complicated Lithuanian and Polish 
relationship.62 It is understandable that Lithuanians were very sensitive about their territorial 
questions. One could expect an emotional reaction. But when a common sense kicked in, 
Lithuanians understood the importance of its ally’s support. Despite small scandals 
Lithuanian diplomats knew that J.Seljamaa would stand for both conflicting sides equally. 
They were aware of the case when J.Seljamaa expressed discontent with Poles while they 
had intervened to rapprochement process of Baltic states.63  But Estonians understood 
emerging suspicions of Lithuania.  “Päevaleht” newspaper dedicated an article about 
Estonian-Polish relations. They reassured that none of Estonian neighbours should worry 
about good Estonian-Polish relations. The ultimate goal of Estonia was to find modus vivendi 
between Lithuania and Poland without solving the problem in favour of one or another side.64 
It is the very same approach that Lithuania and Poland had been striving for some time. 
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International community attentively followed the visit of the former Polish prime minister 
A.Prystor in Lithuania. Even though it was presented as a private visit, he met also 
government officials. The moderate Estonian diplomacy did not show any specific sympathy 
or support for any side, but simply applauded attempts of some kind of solution that both 
sides would accept. J. Seljamaa was certain reconciliation would be a clever step for 
Lithuania. At the same time, it would improve international situation. Nevertheless, it should 
not come at any price, especially if this price is to get down Lithuania on its knees.65  
J. Seljamaa’s wish to improvement international situation had probably something to do with 
an old dream to create a common front against Germany and the Soviet Union, consisting of 
the countries lying between these two adversaries. J. Seljamaa was an experienced diplomat.  
In the 1920s when this idea of a broad union was being discussed he resided as envoy in both 
Baltic states and the Soviet Union. The only real issue which blasted this idea was the conflict 
over Vilnius. If he did not have in mind exact the same project, he was definitely thinking to 
consolidate small states and make them more resistant. In the mid of 1930s, he saw a window 
of opportunities to resolve the conflict. A wish of successful and peaceful settlement of the 
conflict he expressed directly to the Polish envoy to Estonia.66  However, J.Seljamaa did not 
take on himself more responsibility and did not mediate between both sides. There seemed 
to be some features of possible mediation from the Estonian side. For instance, envoy J. 
Markus in Warsaw once asked J. Beck to tell under which circumstances relationship could 
be improved.67 Nonetheless, it looked more like a general interest without any intentions to 
take an active role. It does not look like J.Seljamaa gave to the envoy any instructions. On 
the other hand, Lithuania denied any interference of Estonia in the matter if it was not 
unconditional support. Otherwise, they would imply that it was Lithuania’s domestic affair. 
The only thing that Lithuania could be happy about (knowing their high standards of 
satisfaction!) was consequential policy of Estonia. It may have not been perfect solution for 
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both – Lithuania and Poland, but it also did not cause any deeper troubles in Polish-Estonian-
Lithuanian relations.  
Despite quite calm period in Estonian policy, the opposition to J. Seljamaa became more 
vocal and set against Lithuania. On August 1st 1935 Latvian envoy informed that at the 
Estonian foreign policy council Lithuania was attacked. J.Seljamaa attempted to keep 
optimistic views, but the council decided to give a clear signal to the official Kaunas that 
they should set in order relations with Poland.68 It was given to understand that the blame 
should be put on Lithuania’s shoulders. There were many occasions when Laidoner’s and 
Seljamaa’s political directions diverged. They both seemed to recognize that Lithuania was 
not a perfect ally but the approach was somehow different. If J.Seljamaa was thinking how 
to prevent spreading influence of the Soviet Union over Lithuania by tightening cooperation 
with them, J.Laidoner emphasized that he would better see collapse of the Baltic union than 
Estonia left defenceless against the Soviet Union.69 Ministry of Foreign Affairs had more and 
more problems to keep integrity of the common Estonian foreign policy, because other 
officials discredited it. Notorious J.Laidoner‘s speech on 3rd May 1936 said on the occasion 
of the Polish national day outlined Lithuanian-Polish relations one-sided. Even V. Munters 
expressed objection to such public utterance. The heads of foreign policy distanced from such 
statements. J. Seljamaa said that he was not going to solidarize with Laidoner‘s statements, 
which was probably the most diplomatic answer to what was done to his reputation. H. 
Laretei was not that vague to condemn Laidoner’s speech. He told Laidoner’s speech was 
well-known to the government and he could only explain that by the general ‘s incompetence 
in foreign affairs.70 
Despite several misunderstandings Vilnius question was quite clearly defined by the Estonian 
diplomats, whereas Klaipėda lacked unanimous opinion. The same problems emerged 
already in 1934 discussing what specific problems were. As it was found out earlier in the 
previous chapter, Klaipėda was left out from the matter of specific problems by Estonia and 
                                                          
68 R. Liepiņš’ report about conference of Estonian envoy 1935 08 01 // LVVA.2575.7.1693 p.15.   
69 Ilmjärv M, Nõukogude Liidu ja Saksamaa vahel Balti riigid ja Soome 1934-1940, Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia, 
Tallinn 1993. p.16. 
70 S.Lozoraitis’ conversation with H. Laretei and J. Seljamaa 1935 05 11 // LCVA.383.7.1894. p.196-198 
27 
 
Latvia. Thus, leaving to Estonia and Latvia freedom of action.   In 1935 J.Seljamaa was quite 
favourable to Lithuanian positions and understood complexity of this question. He 
recognized Germany being common threat to Estonians, as well as, Lithuanians. He did not 
avoid critique to Lithuanians who would allow Germanization to take place in the region. 
However, intentions might have been only positive. J. Seljamaa might have fear the loss of 
Klaipėda. After all, he strictly declined to sign any bilateral non-aggression pact with 
Germany leaving Lithuania outside the treaty, which would jeopardize its security. Security 
guarantees of Germany was one of primary tasks of both countries’ diplomats. Lithuanian 
envoy P. Dailidė raised the question of German military units’ deployment right cross the 
border. J. Seljamaa avoided straight answer but told that this question should be discussed 
with Latvia, in case there would be any aggressive behaviour from Germany.71 Of course, 
the stakes were high and Estonia had to be very careful dealing with German threat, therefore 
they would never stand clearly on Lithuanian side. Lithuanians tried to push Estonian to show 
support. S. Lozoraitis in one conversation with envoy Leppik emphasized: “Estonian 
government signing with us the treaty of Baltic Entente knew very well our situation and our 
troubles. Since then nothing has changed. The Estonian government knew the situation very 
well.”72 This might have been S. Lozoraitis clever reminder of Estonia’s unfulfilled 
obligation since Klaipėda did not belong to the specific questions. But we have to take the 
situation in Klaipėda was unstable - there were rash improvements but also huge crisis and 
the danger of Germany was growing gradually. Lithuania was also partly responsible for this 
instability.  J. Seljamaa decided better not to sharpen the situation even more he left to 
develop the situation in its own way. Very soon Klaipėda became de facto one of specific 
problems. 
Despite any clear guarantees, Estonia was active through diplomatic channels. In 
conversations with German ambassador O. Reinebeck, J. Seljamaa expressed concerns that 
Germany could unexpectedly take action against Lithuania and if so, it could mean that 
Germany would lose trust here, as well as, anywhere else.73 But on the other hand, Estonia 
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re-assured Germany that they, by no means, help Lithuania in territorial question, even if 
they boast about it.74 Nevertheless, J.Seljamaa did not tolerate ungrounded insults addressed 
to Lithuania. O. Reinebeck complained about poorly observed Klaipėda statute, Seljamaa 
rebuffed these claims tauntingly: “It seems Memel German are holier than Pope himself “-
referring to German anti-state activities.  
The question is still left opened: how serious Estonia considered German threat? 1935 April 
in their opinion, there was no danger of Germany or at least a threat that they would dare to 
solve territorial question by using violence, while European public opinion would turn 
against them.75 They believed that fair observation of the Klaipėda would contain Germany’s 
aggressive policy. J.Seljamaa positively assessed 1935 November elections to the Klaipėda 
territorial council, after which prevailed peace for some time. But they constantly heard two 
extremely different opinions of what was happening in Klaipėda. The first being the Soviet 
Union which would frighten that observation of statute would not appease Germans and 
Brits, who sharply criticized Lithuanians regarding this question. Seljamaa adopted the 
middle way amidst two. He understood that they have the same foreign policy interests as 
other two Baltic states and that security of one Baltic state was in interest of other two.76 But 
it was little done to materialize this concept in reality by obliging themselves to help in case 
of German attack or simply boost cooperation in other ways. In general, Seljamaa’s moderate 
policy was not harmful to Lithuania, they left the things develop in their own way. 
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2.2. A new course of foreign policy: military circles take over 
 
Right after J.Seljamaa left the office and F. Akel became a new minister of foreign affairs, 
there was a feeling that it was a turning point. Lithuanian diplomats noticed that F. Akel was 
under Laidoner‘s influence. V. Munters was also concerned about the rumours that H. Laretei 
was tired and he would like to go abroad.77 Two pro- Baltic foreign policy shapers whether 
left or were thinking to leave the office. F. Akel wanted to calm down the partners and give 
an impression that nothing would change in the Estonian foreign policy. But his reassurance 
and actions were different. Once he would confirm commitments for Baltic states but the 
next day, he would not promise any help until Lithuania reconcile with Poland. He would 
also repeat Laidoner‘s position that Estonia should sacrifice only for Estonia and Latvia.78  
A new problem emerged in the Estonian foreign policy. It lost consistency and there was 
hard to say who was in charge. It is doubtful that F. Akel represented his own position. 
Personally, he seemed to claim that he values good relations with Poland but denied Baltic-
Polish alliance. Publicly he sent completely different message and spoke to one Estonian 
newspaper for expansion of the Baltic Entente.79  P. Dailidė himself noticed that F. Akel does 
not value special relations with Poland. According to him F. Akel questioned Poland’s 
readiness to help in the case of war. He personally seemed to advocate for a better Polish-
Lithuanian relationship, meaning entering diplomatic relations, with no sacrifices being made 
(meaning Vilnius question should be left opened). But the problem was that F.Akel did not 
have freedom of action. He admitted that he has to respect sympathies to Poland, especially 
its military circles.80 And these mutual sympathies manifested in various forms. For instance, 
Latvian envoy in Warsaw was amazed by the fact that on Estonian Independence Day 
celebrations 1936 prevailed military character which manifested through predominantly 
military personnel among the audience.81 
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F. Akel most probably relied on military circles following their instructions. He did not have 
any personal attachment to Poland, he was a diplomat not a military officer. His last residing 
place had been Berlin before he was called off from Berlin and became foreign minister. 
Instead of adoring Poland, the rumours were spreading that he had developed good 
relationship with Nazi party leaders, such as A Rosenberg and G. Leibbrandt. In relation to 
that, British ambassador in Riga 1936 May 16 feared Estonia would fall under German 
influence.82  According to Latvian historian E. Andersons, the whole Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs apparatus was replaced by pro-Polish and pro-German individuals.83 This included 
chief of military headquarters N. Reek, Estonian envoy to Lithuania O. Öpik. The later in his 
memoirs wrote that Klaipėda was a German city.84 Before leaving Lithuania to become vice-
minister he told that his primary task would be to compel Lithuania to agree with German 
terms. 85 Another prominent pro-German person was envoy in Berlin K. Toffer. In German 
correspondence he was described as a sincere admirer of the Führer and national socialism.86 
Germans were looking for means how to exert influence on Lithuania through Estonia. 
Germany felt that Estonia could be that Trojan horse, which would help to disintegrate the 
whole Baltic cooperation and drag country by country to German sphere. Newspaper 
“Postimees” wrote: “Berlin with pleasure observed escalation of Lithuanian domestic 
situation, therefore it is no surprise that German diplomacy attempt in Northern 
neighbours[Estonia] discredit their confidence in Lithuania in order to weaken Baltic 
union”.87 Germans internal correspondence confirm usage of pressure against Lithuania in 
order to fulfil demands that the Memel statute be observed, especially abolition of the state 
of martial law and withdrawal of the Lithuanian political police. 88 K. Tofer seemed to have 
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no objections to full observation of the statute from the German side [although they were not 
one of signatory states89 of the statue].90  
The more Germany pressured Lithuania, the more engaged was Estonia in Klaipėda. The 
new foreign minister K. Selter had surprising proposals, which did not appear as a sincere 
provision of help. He did not think anymore, as it was accepted in Estonian foreign policy, 
that Germany put in a dangerous position Estonia, but from that moment Lithuania increased 
threat to Estonia and other small states by the lack of compliance with Germany. 
Conversations between Lithuanians and Estonians left an impression that Estonian advocated 
to Germans rather than sincerely helped both parties to solve the conflict. Estonians delivered 
Germans’ message that they would not put any obstacles regarding transportation and 
promised extremely unbelievably good conditions – “We will build golden bridges” – told 
K. Selter to the Lithuanian partners.91 Additionally, to that, K. Selter kindly offered his 
mediation but it was hard to believe his honesty. He told directly in advance that Lithuania 
has two ways – to leave the situation as it is or come forward with an offer to Germans and 
finally solve this issue. In both scenarios K. Selter leaned to the idea that Lithuania would 
lose sovereignty they have over Klaipėda, but in the case of the second scenario it would be 
possible to get back the money invested in Klaipėda, get economic privileges, build a new 
sea port in Šventoji, and stabilize the situation. 92 Even if K. Selter seriously believed to 
improve situation, Hitler had made his decisions already sooner and the negotiations would 
have been a bluff. Hitler had issued 21st October 1938 a new military directive for takeover 
of Memel, which stated the military should prepare for the seizure of Memel.93 Germany was 
exerting pressure not only threatening direct military almighty but also appealing to 
“common sense” through allies, which might have worked even as a better persuasive mean, 
because Lithuania did hand over Klaipėda peacefully without military intervention. Does it 
mean Estonia was a German puppet? It would be correct to say that Estonia sought after its 
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own interests, their primary interest was securing peace in its region and if the price was 
appeasement that was a small price to pay. Of course, Germans themselves emphasized 
Estonia’s friendliness to them.94 However, no direct links of influence on Lithuania through 
Estonia were found. 
The main strategist who was behind all of the Estonian policy since around 1936 was J. 
Laidoner. According to the information that Lithuanians disposed there were two persons 
who had decisive political role in Estonia – K. Päts and J. Laidoner. The latter was mostly 
interested in the foreign policy behind the scenes. “J. Laidoner gave instructions to Estonian 
press how to reflect on foreign policy of other countries”- , wrote one of the diplomats.95 J. 
Laidoner being from military circles and with very restricted diplomatic experience did not 
have very clear and integral view of foreign policy on which other countries could rely. From 
time to time, he was called polonophile, but the sources told to Lithuanian diplomats that it 
was a common position among elder military personnel to have a lot of sympathies for Poland 
and especially their military circles, but his political thinking leaned toward England.96 V. 
Munters had hard time as well to understand Laidoner’s thinking. He evaluated him as a 
person who had peculiar opinions in some question and these opinions were not quite clear, 
because he did not know what he wanted.97 
Mostly Lithuanians were enraged by J. Laidoner’s undiplomatic statements that put Lithuania 
in difficult position. Without any consultation with his partners or his own diplomatic service, 
he openly gave interviews to the media about Lithuanian-Polish relations. Estonian envoy J. 
Markus tried to clarify to his Latvian counterpart M. Valters that they should not make a lot 
of thoughts about Laidoner’s speeches, while they are too military, straight and 
undiplomatic.98 One of a colourful example of his “performances” was given interview to 
“Journal de Geneve“. He openly condemned Lithuania for a failure to establish good relations 
with Germany and Poland. He expressed a wish to finally fix these relationships. The remarks 
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were noticed by the Lithuanian diplomatic service. At the audience with envoy Leppik, S. 
Lozoraitis noted that Laidoner’s statements could be understood as if it was Lithuania’s fault 
that relationship with Poland and Germany go in this way.99 Leppik counterattacked instantly 
by saying that the Estonian society had gradually more and more concerns about Lithuania’s 
relations with the neighbours and that at some extent paralyzed the cooperation between 
Baltic states. S. Lozoraitis did not give up easily explaining his truth. He came back to this 
question once more 6 months later when he met J. Seljamaa. Foreign minister of Estonia 
totally agreed with S. Lozoraitis opinion and told confidentially that after the last interview 
of Laidoner given in Helsinki he mentioned at the cabinet meeting that the interviews of this 
nature are not welcomed.100 J. Laidoner obviously crossed all diplomatic lines by raising 
sensitive questions publicly and exceeded his competences of being a military person, despite 
his high rank. The last drop was Laidoner’s arrogance when Lithuanians wanted to present 
state decorations to the general but he refused to accept them. At this tense atmosphere, 
neither A. Smetona nor Lozoraitis visited 20th year celebration of Estonia’s independence in 
Kaunas. This did not resemble Seljamaa’s moderate position which in reality did distinguish 
from J. Laidoner’s but his undiplomatic behaviour might have given different impression. 
Seljamaa used various instruments to push Lithuania and Poland towards a settlement of the 
conflict but it would be instruments of diplomatic nature.  
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2.3. From Baltic Entente to neutrality? 
 
Since creation of the Baltic entente prevailed two opinions of the cooperation which were 
closely related with the territorial problems of Lithuania. The first group of moderates were 
in favour of a closer cooperation between Baltic states and they led the process of 
implementation of this idea. Meanwhile, the second group was formed by military officers, 
diplomats who leaned towards Poland and Germany. They sceptically referred to the Baltic 
union. There was also another categorization described by Estonian journalist Taklaja. He 
divided these two groups into younger and elder generations. The former being supporters of 
the union with Latvia and Lithuania and the latter, who sceptically referred to cooperation. 
In his opinion, the society was in favour of this union, but it could be more effective if 
domestic situation in all countries stabilized.101 He clearly meant the specific questions 
saying that the success of the unity was closely dependent on these territorial questions. 
Estonian envoy to Lithuania said it directly that Estonian society looking with a great unrest 
at the conflicts and it would be wrong to think it does not make any impact on Baltic 
cooperation.102 Hence, the impact of specific problems to the whole cooperation did not pass 
unnoticed. 
In 1934 the moderates were still in power. They found solution how to balance between 
specific problems and closer cooperation. They chose to lay aside the problems for the future 
and try to build on what was the best at the given situation. The prevailing consensus in the 
media and on political level was that the impact of Baltic states separately on international 
arena is weak, but together they would have more leverage to push its agenda.103 However, 
it was not that easy to reach consensus inside the country. There was opposition that pulled 
stronger to Polish and German side. One evident example of it was previously mentioned 
Seljamaa’s ride to Warsaw.104 According to envoy R. Liepiņš, it was organized under 
someone’s influence. 105 Even though the names were not given away there were rumours 
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that J. Laidoner was interested in the 25th April aide mémoire and he was the first to make 
clear gesture that Estonia did not abandon friendship with Poland. Despite Laidoner’s pro-
Polish orientation (as many of his time politicians called him) it would be too strong to call 
Laidoner an agent of Poland or Germany. He was a pragmatic military person not a diplomat, 
therefore he concentrated on the current situation rather than preparing a long-term vision. 
He was not a person who would seek after common denominators with other countries. He 
counted pragmatically that Lithuania’s problems contain much more danger than benefit. It 
was a weak alternative against aggressive Germany and the Soviet Union. Had not Lithuania 
had deep problems Laidoner probably would have been interested in a deeper cooperation. 
After all he had hopes and conversations with Latvian general J.Balodis about reviving 
defence union.106 But it was doomed to fail while countries had cultural and economic 
disputes. The result-oriented J. Laidoner’s point of view manifests in his statement that “the 
union had not reached any noteworthy results”.107 Of course it only deepened the crisis and 
enraged the partners. In 1936 may the official Kaunas sent aide mémoire quoting Laidoner’s 
words: “We have to admit that in reality batic unity as such does not exist. There is only a 
treaty of a limited cooperation, but this cooperation has not been fruitful so far.” 108 Thus, the 
crisis spreaded to the diplomatic level. 
H.Laretei believed that Baltic entente strengthens the whole region. If Vilnius question was 
successfully solved, a broader front against Germany and the Soviet Union could be formed. 
Laretei was afraid of possible changes of Estonian society opinion, which could push Estonia 
to conclude non-aggression pact without Lithuania if they did not move forward in 
relationships with Poland and Germany.109 In one of his interviews to “Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung” he depicted situation grim. He stated that the Baltic Entente cannot be real and 
lively, because one of the members has two questions.110 But it did not mean that Laretei was 
on the same page with J. Laidoner. Even Lithuanian envoy in Riga had an impression of H. 
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Laretei as a big protagonist of the Baltic Entente.111 Moreover, H. Laretei was concerned 
about losing societies’ support, after which even the moderates would be compelled to 
change their attitude and lean more to Pro-German, pro-Polish wing. 
The society sympathized to the unity. “Uus Eesti” newspaper saw importance in the 
cooperation, because complicated times had come.112 In another published article about 
Lithuania-German relations in Klaipėda they wrote: “We could ask ourselves why all this 
matter for us Estonians and Latvians if all of this is Lithuania’s business. However, we all 
three concluded a treaty we are all interested that all three signatory states would have good 
relationship with other states. Good relationship helps to strengthen mutual cooperation, but 
conflicts of one participant have a huge impact on the whole cooperation and other signatory 
states.113 Newspaper “Päevaleht” in one of 14th October articles analysed Russian-German 
relationship and the situation of the Baltic states. The newspaper came to conclusion that 
Estonia had to stick to the Baltic Entente.114 But the longer territorial problems lasted, the 
more vocal became voices who proposed different orientation of Estonian foreign policy.  
The fuss was caused by I. Tõnisson’s article in the journal “Akadeemia“. He proposed that 
Estonia should turn to Scandinavia, while the Baltic Entente do not bring any useful results. 
The article favoured neutrality. Otherwise Estonia would be dragged to Russian-German 
conflict.115 He also counted probability of German or Soviet attack to every Baltic state.  He 
was sure that there was a very weak possibility that Germany would attack Estonia, whereas 
the Soviet threat was considered with high probability. The understanding that reliance on 
Lithuania, which had two territorial problems, was not sufficient to ensure Estonia’s security 
against growing threat of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Germany posed very little direct 
danger, according to Estonian leaders. “XX amžius” depicted the article of Tõnnison as 
delusional. According to them, it was wrong to think that “the big neighbours would bite a 
piece of Lithuania or Latvia and would leave Estonia intact”.116  
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The territorial questions of Lithuania were the main obstacle to strengthen and develop 
further the Baltic cooperation. J. Seljamaa as well as J. Laidoner expressed the same idea but 
in a different manner – solving territorial questions was crucial for the Baltic entente. Despite 
all hardships, Estonians did not betray the unity between Baltic States and refused to sign 
bilateral non-aggression treaties between Germany and Estonia without incorporating 
Lithuania in it.117  However, the Baltic Entente appeared to have its limits. J. Laidoner was 
keen to cooperate as far as it does not contradict Estonia’s interests. Lithuania saw security 
in multilateral cooperation, because they could not withstand the pressure of Germany or 
Poland alone. But Vilnius and Klaipėda conflicts contributed substantially that the Baltic 
Entente would not develop further. That being said, the arguments proving that specific 
problems led directly to neutrality are too weak. 
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CHAPTER 3. SPECIFIC APPROACH OF LATVIAN 
DIPLOMACY TO THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS 
Activities of Latvian diplomacy proves the fact that there was only one specific problem – 
Vilnius question. The events in Klaipėda were perceived differently and Latvian diplomats 
were more eager to discuss about emerging issues in Klaipėda. It was a result of two factors: 
Latvia, as well as Lithuania, feared any military actions of Germany. Secondly, Latvia 
considered Baltic unity as the most important. There was no reason to sacrifice relationship 
with Poland but Latvia shared a lot of views with Lithuania regarding Germany aggression. 
Lithuania felt they would have backing in Klaipėda. The understanding on both sides that: 
“No Lithuania meant no Latvia and vice versa” was deeply rooted among many politicians 
and diplomats. This strongly drew both  countries together and laid the foundations for a 
good cooperation in the framework of billateral and Baltic cooperation.  Of course, both 
specific questions were important and they both were an integral part in any discussions about 
the future of the Baltic unity. However, Latvia treated Klaipėda question with more flexibility 
than Estonia even though the means they used were limited to diplomacy. Thus, Latvia 
neither fully supported Lithuania (what would be expected from the real ally) nor ignored the 
problem fully. 
Similarly like Estonia, Latvians took a neutral stance on Vilnius issues. In spite of that, there 
were significant differences in the meaning of “neutrality”. “Neutral stance” did not imply 
indifference, quite an opposite. 1934-1938 Latvian diplomacy was engaged in the processes 
in Vilnius and discussed about them with both sides. Yet it was quite far from the real 
mediation, but there were enough signs referring that Latvia would take this role with 
pleasure. Latvians enjoyed Lithuanians’ trust. Some Lithuanian diplomats even understood 
why Poland was such important country for Latvia. According to them, Poland earned a lot 
of thankfulness in Latvia due to historical help, but they would not notice that Latvians would 
try to push Lithuania towards Poland. Poland was also content with Latvians, they thought 
they could use Latvian mediation in order to force Lithuania to reconciliation.  
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As it was already mentioned, Latvians were active participants in the conflict and one of the 
main requirements to Lithuanians was more transparency and clarity in these specific issues. 
This might sound odd but Lithuanians did not have clear policy regarding Vilnius except 
aspirations to get it back.  But the reality was that international situation was changing and 
the problem of Vilnius became obsolete in the eyes of international community. There were 
new challenges and Vilnius was an obstacle that did not allow to tackle with them. Moreover, 
Lithuania dealt with much stronger states such as Poland which would not give up its demand 
without getting something in returning. Latvia understood it and demanded clarity of 
Lithuania’s further actions, especially when it comes to discussions about conclusion of non-
aggression pacts and the Eastern pact.118 V. Munters considered as “necessary and inevitable” 
that Lithuanians would express formal position and acquaint them with their intention in both 
questions. V. Munters added that unclear position could be damaging to the Baltic 
solidarity.119 The Minister of Foreign Affairs was never pushy or demanded reconciliation 
with Poland and Germany without any trade-offs but he was relatively tired of hearing the 
same arguments about L. Żeligowski and the Hague tribunal120. The only answer that 
Lithuania provided was the statement of Klaipėda and Vilnius being domestic problems 
which was, of course, not sufficient answer. V. Munters told clearly that he had no wish to 
interfere in domestic affairs [meant Vilnius and Klaipėda problems]. However, he was 
looking for an opportunity to tell that the treaty of establishing diplomatic relations with 
Poland, which would leave Vilnius question opened would be at this moment the best 
solution. It would not undermine Lithuanian position and both sides would profit. Munters 
named one argument after another and he seemed to be impartial. Negotiations with Poles 
and opening this question again would have given a new boost to Lithuanians and facilitated 
the Baltic cooperation. 
V. Munters eagerly shared his views on the specific problems. Especially in Klaipėda he saw 
a lot of windows of opportunities. According to him, Lithuanians could wait until local 
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elections pass and freeze all negotiations in the meantime but it would not guarantee what 
would happen in those 3-4 months. The second Munters’ proposal was to begin official 
negotiations with Germans and eliminate their propaganda. On the other hand, he felt it could 
be risky to retreat too much which would result to acceptance of new unfavourable 
conditions. Lithuanian envoy V.Vileišis seemed to agree with V. Munters insights.121 Even 
though V. Munters mentioned advantages and disadvantages of both possible approaches, he 
most probably preferred the second option. He was suspicious about reaching any positive 
outcomes in the local elections. He predicted gradual growth of German authority. At this 
moment Lithuania had more leverage to negotiate. By no means, Munters wanted to allow 
collapse of Lithuanian positions in Klaipėda. At that moment he saw an opportunity to 
negotiate as equals and maybe gain some moral and material benefits. It was already clear 
that Germany becoming a super power. V. Munters was also very sceptical that signatory 
states would be very interested in Klaipėda issues and he did not count on their support.122 
He had information that the Great Britain pushed Lithuania to create normal conditions in 
Klaipėda under which local parliament should function and trustworthy directory would have 
to be founded. The Foreign Office told V. Munters personally that he should exert his 
influence and bring Lithuanians to common sense as long as it was not too late.123  
Latvian diplomacy was very active and dynamic. No wonder super powers imagined them 
as mediators. V. Munters managed to stay diplomatic and keep his own controversial 
opinions to himself so Lithuanians would not be infuriated. There was a huge difference 
between Latvian and Estonian criticism. Latvia was not pushy. They sought for the best 
solution for both sides. Latvian envoy L. Sēja was surprised by the new vice minister of 
Estonia position regarding Lithuania. According to L. Sēja, O. Öpik thought that there was 
lack of goodwill from Lithuanian side to fix relations with Poland and reach any compromise 
with them. He was also certain that Lithuania was challenging Germany in Klaipėda, as a 
result, dragging Latvia and Estonia down together with them and weakening their situation. 
L. Sēja could not believe this and he wanted to know whether these statements corresponded 
                                                          
121 Conversation between Vileišis and Munters about specific problems 1935 06 07 // LVVA.2575.7.83. p. 20. 
122 Lithuanian envoy conversation with V. Munters 1935 06 09 // LCVA.648.1.22 41 
123 Opinion about Klaipėda question and situation in Lithuania 1935 10 28 // LVVA.1313.1.92. p.393 
41 
 
to the governmental position.124 Another Latvian envoy M. Valters informed his government 
that Estonians were beloved in Poland and they were under strong Polish influence. M. 
Valters noticed that Polish media repeated often what Tallinn said. The latest example of that 
was an article, in which the Baltic Entente was depicted as non-existent and the Polish-
Lithuanian conflict considered as the main cause for that. M. Valters wrote in his report that 
he was obliged to defend position that Baltic Entente did exist and the conflict did not 
influence the cooperation at such extent as it would look like.125  M. Valters tried not to put 
a lot of attention at the conflicts as the main failure for the union. They were worried that 
Estonians stressed so much reluctance of Lithuanians to comply. Moreover, there were even 
more frightening information floating around. envoy R. Liepiņš heard that colonel R. 
Maasing bragged about Germany’s offer to Estonians to conclude non-aggression treaty and 
he predicted that in the nearest future Germany and Poland would improve their relationship 
which would lead to division of Lithuania and South Latvia. Even though this information 
was received as a rumour, R. Liepiņš took it seriously, he could hardly believe that allied 
army could spread such disgraceful news.126    
It was even more striking for Latvians because they so much believed in the importance of 
the Baltic Entente. While A. Smetona concentrated on gaining at any price Vilnius and K. 
Päts feared growth of the Soviet Union, K. Ulmanis at the conference of envoys in 1935 
emphasized that the Baltic cooperation strengthens Latvian positions.127 At the same 
conference diplomat K. Zariņš proposed to expand the union to economic and military fields. 
Of course, he was right to say that it could only be done after reconciliation with Poland and 
Germany, otherwise the cooperation would exist with reservations.128 Economic and defence 
union was the main aim that only few believed could be really accomplished. V.Munters was 
more down-to-earth. He thought that positive sequence of actions in Vilnius question would 
have positive effect on the Baltic cooperation. For this reason, he assigned Latvian envoy to 
Germany to speak about it with his counterpart envoy J. Šaulys. H. Celmiņš pointed out to J. 
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Šaulys that in the name of Entente and general Eastern Europe security it would be necessary 
to reconciliate with Poland. H. Celmiņš regretted that the conflict would have been easier 
solved sooner when J. Piłsudski was alive. J.Šaulys raised two conditions for successful 
establishment of diplomatic relations: Lithuanian minority in Vilnius must be stopped 
persecuted and Vilnius questions - left opened. He imagined active role of Latvia and Estonia 
in making this deal, therefore he asked H. Celmiņš to talk over this question with Polish 
envoy Lipski.  He took this role seriously and a little later visited Lipski. However, the 
conversation was not fruitful. J.Lipski blamed Lithuanians for setting up some kind of 
commission to investigate Polish activities. He suggested establishing direct contacts in order 
to proceed in a normal manner.129 This clearly showed that Latvians had no chance for 
successful facilitation of the conflict. Poland was not ready for any compliance. Even if the 
Poles showed more understanding, there were no guarantees Lithuanians would have come 
to terms. J. Šaulys was Polish-friendlier than most of the Lithuanian diplomatic service. In 
spite of all hardships, Latvians tried to find out consensus for very good reasons. The stronger 
Baltic states tied with Poland the more chances they had to withstand German threat and the 
latter was considered to be the real danger. 
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3.1. Active neutrality: helping to find consensus in Vilnius 
 
Latvia adhered to neutral position because Poland and Lithuania were more or less equally 
important partners. Whenever Lithuania or Poland attempted to win Latvia’s support they 
resisted and denied any allegiance to one or another side. This was the case when Lithuanian 
community celebrated its Independence Day in Riga and Lithuanian envoy held a speech 
with references to Vilnius occupation. Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted quickly. 
They showed anger that Lithuania used their hospitality and territory in order to start old 
provocations which had seemed to be over.130 Latvian diplomats managed this scandal to 
keep quiet from Poland and V.Vileišis admitted crossing the red line. In the same nature 
Latvians treated Polish diplomats who thought could use Latvia in order to reach its goals. 
Poland tried to show that Lithuania was to blame and they had no intentions to establish 
relations. Foreign minister of Poland J. Beck ensured that they did not use diplomatic 
channels to harm Lithuania. According to him, Lithuania itself constantly created obstacles. 
Latvian envoy M. Valters responded to Beck’s statements with a suggestion to come forward 
with their own proposals. The envoy wanted to give an impression that the conditions in 
Lithuania are favourable for new Polish proposals. 131 Rather than listening Polish diplomats’ 
complaints Latvia welcomed a dialogue. They knew that Poland set strict preconditions - to 
establish diplomatic relations. Polish complaints did not make the situation in no way easier. 
Latvia wanted to see a constructive dialogue between both parties. 
It was surely not easy with Lithuania too. Latvians saw the conflict had reached the stage 
where you really could hardly do something. M. Valters thought Vilnius questions reached 
“chronicle disease level”. The stage where it would be better to leave it as it is only trying to 
contain both sides from minority repressions.132 Latvians understood how little could be done 
in this situation. Lithuanian society had been long fed with hatred and anger. L. Sēja 
described Vilnius issue as an integral part of Lithuanian domestic life. No government would 
be capable to move this question from the deadlock. At least, L. Sēja thought that this 
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particular government was on the brink of downfall and incapable to make changes. He also 
noticed how the opposition to Smetona’s regime used this question for their power games.133  
Who is to blame for unsuccessful attempts to establish relations? Latvians noticed that 
strained relationship of Lithuania and Germany naturally pushed Lithuania to the Polish side 
and they were the ones more interested in some kind of modus vivendi with Poland. L. Sēja 
was certain the Poles were not thinking to provide any help for Lithuanians against 
Germany.134 Envoy M. Valters after reading L. Sēja’s impressions of the situation in Kaunas 
came to conclusion that chief of Eastern department at the Polish ministry T.Kobylański’s 
thoughts are as subjective as the ones heard in Kaunas. He referred to T.Kobylański’s 
approach to the settlement of the conflict. M.Valters had more hopes in J. Beck who was 
more restrained and less noticeable whereas T.Kobylański was prone to escalate the 
question.135 Latvia carefully assessed Polish attitude to Lithuania and did not cherish any 
hopes that Poland would facilitate conflict solution. It might be that Poland expected 
Germany to weaken Lithuania which would give an opportunity to utilize this situation and 
come to better terms with Lithuania. Latvians did not speculate in such way but they noticed 
peculiar lack of cooperation from Poland and even sabotaging any possible deal.  Lithuanians 
were not cooperative as well but for different reasons. In fact, L. Sēja was advised by some 
Lithuanian intellectuals not to interfere in Polish-Lithuanian crisis because Lithuanian nation 
would not value Latvian help even if it averts military actions of Poland. The nation would 
think Latvians worked for Polish interests.136 
Latvians did not count on Polish aggressive activities. There were some reports prepared by 
L. Sēja about the conflicts at the Lithuanian-Polish border territory. L. Sēja did not buy J. 
Beck’s attempts to pretend he had nothing to do with that. Latvians knew Poland could use 
border conflicts in order to push Lithuania to establish relations (and the future showed a 
border conflict really happened) but this scenario, according to Latvians, was only 
imaginable if the conflict between Germany-Lithuania would start and Poland used it as a 
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pretext.137 The Eastern flank between Poland and Lithuania was entrenched but Germany’s 
actions could encourage Poland to use the situation. In this context, Latvians did not exclude 
the chance that Latvia could also suffer from this scenario as much as Lithuania. Latvian 
envoy M. Valters quoted “Gazeta Warszawska” article in which Paris conference times were 
recalled when Polish politician R. Dmowski had demanded to join Klaipėda region to Poland 
as autonomic region. It was also highly possible that Southern part of Latvia would be 
attached to this autonomic region [at least, Latvians thought so].138 In the current situation it 
was more hypothetical sequence of actions but taking into consideration tensed situation in 
Klaipėda this scenario was not absolutely excluded. A true friend of Lithuania, envoy 
A.Bilmanis considered any cultural autonomy of Eastern part of Lithuania as dangerous to 
Lithuania as for Latvia while the same cultural ambitions would be demanded in Latgalia.139 
Not only politicians were concerned. These fears were quite widely spread in the society. A 
popular Swedish newspaper wrote that Latvian society was well aware of the Polish plans of 
annexation, which are noticeable, in the first place, in Daugavpils and Liepaja.140  Differently 
from Estonia, Latvia always acted more restrained to Poland and Germany even felt that 
agreement between two of them could be prepared against Latvia. This was not, of course, a 
blind belief of conspiracy. V. Munters himself wrote that majority of these statements 
belonged to fantasy, but these were spread and repeated so many times that one could starts 
to doubt and become nervous.141 They knew they would have to be cautious not only about 
what was happening in Latvia but also in Lithuania because Vilnius and Klaipėda problems 
directly touched upon Latvian interests.  
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3.1.1. Mediation between Lithuania and Poland: the key to Latvia’s national security 
 
V. Munters attempted many times to bring S. Lozoraitis and J. Beck together in order to find 
a solution in the conflict. V. Munters admitted that right after the Baltic Entente treaty had 
been signed, he took initiative to establish first contacts between Poland and Lithuania. The 
same happened a year after, in 1935, during the League of Nations assembly. The only thing 
that he achieved was to give Latvian facilities for a meeting. However, long-lasting changes 
the conversations did not bring. In 1937 V. Munters believed that reconciliation can be 
achieved without establishing diplomatic relations. It would be difficult to imagine that V. 
Munters was not aware of J. Beck’s position. J. Beck told many times that without diplomatic 
relations reconciliation cannot be realized. Self-respectable mediator probably would not 
have attempted so many times to bring both sides on the table if he had not have could reason. 
V. Munters in 1937 stated himself that a third party cannot interfere in order to solve the 
conflict.142 But this did not stop him coming back to the question later again. Neither Poland 
nor Lithuania approved V. Munters’ mediation therefore his stubbornness was quite 
surprising. Some Latvian politicians were also sceptical about interference in it. Former 
minister of foreign affairs V. Salnais admitted that Lithuanians or Poles did not ask for 
Latvian support therefore it would only cause suspicions to Lithuania.143 V. Munters’ high 
interest in the issue could be explained with the fact that he believed this matter was not only 
about bilateral Polish Lithuanian relations. Geopolitical situation was deteriorating and 
Germany became dangerous to Latvian national security.  
Lithuanians were suspicious of such V. Munters’ interest in Polish-Lithuanian relations. 
They were not sure what were the main V. Munters’s intentions. He sensed himself that there 
was a lack of trust in him and he could be labelled as some kind of Polish envoy. He re-
assured Lithuanians that he conducted these conversations at its own will and his own name 
without any encouragement or order.144 There is no doubt that Poles attempted to influence 
Latvians to be more favourable to their point of view. But there was no reason not to believe 
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Munters’ words. On the contrary, Latvian diplomats seemed to clearly understand Polish 
insidious objectives. M. Valters wrote that T. Kobylański wanted to push Munters to the 
position of mediator who would help to reach favourable outcome to Poland but M. Valters 
denied any subjectivity and indicated that they wanted to keep friendly relations with both 
sides.145  
Munters had no thoughts to serve one or another state’s objectives. He had his own goals that 
might have more matched with the Polish ones. However, he did not want to reach 
reconciliation at any price. He appealed to conscience of Lithuanians and warned them that 
situation would only get worse. V.Munters mentioned that Germany with its “Drang nach 
Osten146” policy cannot be considered as a friend. In his mind, Germany was happy to see 
disagreements between Poland and Lithuania. The absence of relations helped Germans to 
exert pressure on Lithuania. As long as Lithuania did not manage to fix the situation Poland 
and Germany would weaken its positions on international level. V. Munters thought this all 
could be avoided if consensus would be found. Lithuanian envoy seemed to be convinced. 
V. Vileišis understood that Latvia protecting its own security.147 In other word, he realized 
that Munters identified Germany as the main danger to Latvia and in order to strengthen their 
own national security Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation was vital.  
V. Munters tried to persuade that reconciliation with Poland would change relations with 
Germany while Lithuania could count on Polish Latvian and Estonian help defending the 
rights of Klaipėda district. On the other hand, honourable treaty with Poles would not burden 
in solving Vilnius issue.148 V. Munters’ words might have sounded seductive but it is hard to 
say how much they were based on reality. Probably he was too optimistic about Poland’s 
eagerness to assist in Klaipėda. J. Beck was pre-occupied with settlement of its own conflict. 
He was even ready to solve it militarily if it was needed. He asked V. Munters to hand over 
message to Lithuanians that if there was a conflict on the Polish-Lithuanian border Poland 
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would shoot.149 Despite the tension between Lithuania and Poland, V. Munters was 
concerned about high probability of Germans taking advantage of this situation which would 
have even bigger reverberations than Polish-Lithuanian conflict.   
Latvians tried to bring Estonians to this matter. Some world powers saw Estonia as a perfect 
mediator. They considered Estonia as a country which had good relations with Poland, as 
well as, with Lithuania. Brits and French expected that Estonian could bring together Poland 
and Lithuania.150 In 1936 H. Celmiņš mentioned to F. Akel a wish to organize negotiations 
between Poland and Lithuania. He willingly agreed to participate in it.151  This would have 
given more leverage to Latvians to conduct negotiations. Estonians seemed to be interested 
in the process. Differently from Latvians, Estonians did not seek for any bigger geopolitical 
aims therefore they did not pursue reconciliation for any cost. The same F. Akel (who was in 
general inclined to mediation) later in 1938 refused to make démarche together with V. 
Munters facing crisis between Lithuania and Poland. F. Akel explained that no contacts were 
established with J. Beck. Moreover, Lithuania neither informed Estonia about the conflict 
nor asked for advices.152 Estonians did not believe that reconciliation between Poles and 
Lithuanians could happen since the influence of the Soviet Union was such big on 
Lithuania.153  
When 1938 March an incident on the border happened, V. Munters took an active role trying 
to clarify the situation. He expressed his concerns to Lithuanian representative that 
international situation compelled the government of Lithuania to consider the question of 
reconciliation with Poland. V. Munters discussed about this question with K. Ulmanis and 
they came to conclusion that German pressure after events in Austria would strengthen on 
neighbouring countries – Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania Denmark and new complication 
might appear on North-East and Eastern border.154 One has to remember these conversations 
took place on the night from 11th to 12th March. V. Munters knew only that something 
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happened on the border of Lithuania and Poland. However, he quickly warned Lithuanians 
not about their direct threat Poland but Germany. 
Lithuania assessed dangers differently from Latvia. Its primary enemy was Poland. 
Lithuanian envoy did not take seriously German threats. He doubted that the rise of Nazism 
in Klaipėda could be compared with what happened in Austria. He believed Austria had its 
own historical reasons and these events cannot be applied to Klaipėda. V. Munters disagreed 
with it and told that Germany after attack on Klaipėda would require signatory rights in 
Klaipėda and nobody would resist it. He told that this maybe would not worry Latvia much 
but Lithuania is an ally and Latvia cares about Lithuania as much as about themselves.155 
Latvians attempted to warn Lithuanians about upcoming dangers in all possible ways. They 
believed Lithuanians did not realize the full scale of dangers. Latvians feared their Lithuanian 
colleagues were thinking that this crisis would be overcome as all others before. V. Munters 
called the envoy on 12th March after Anschluss and the conflict with Poland. Interestingly, 
Lithuanian envoy was not surprised that the conversation turned to the matters happening in 
Austria.156 In this conversation V. Munters also mentioned that J. Beck told: “If Lithuania 
agreed with Poland, then me myself would come to Klaipėda with combat vehicles and 
Germans would have to understand what would it mean...”157 It is clear that both countries 
could not reach a common language because their interests or geopolitical view was 
completely different. 
 It is now clear that Germany discussed about such sequence of actions that V. Munters 
warned of. German deputy director of the political department Bismarck wrote in one of 
memorandum: “If an open conflict should break out between Poland and Lithuania and 
Poland actually sent a warship to Memel, it would be desirable for the protection of our 
claims to the Memel Territory to have a German warship appear off Memel 
simultaneously“.158 After the conflict had been calmed down, H. Celmiņš enquired in Berlin 
whether there were agreements between Poland and Germany before the Polish ultimatum. 
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Nobody provided this kind of information but the idea of division of spheres was not 
excluded. The American ambassador told that he had heard rumours. According to him, in 
case Lithuanian reject the ultimatum, Poland would get the whole Lithuania and Germans 
would get the Polish corridor.159 
3.2. Silent support of Lithuania’s sovereignty over Klaipėda region 
 
Klaipėda question was not considered as specific problem. It proves not only 1934 
conversations between heads of foreign policy, but also V. Munters’ phrase told a year later: 
”Klaipėda question do not belong to specific question in the sense as it is defined in the 
treaty’s third article because according to Lithuania,  the region is subjected by Lithuanian 
sovereignty  and the responsibility of observation of Klaipėda statue carries signatory states 
and the League of Nation council.”160 But reality did not always corresponded the facts and 
interests of countries. Estonia did basically nothing and did not support any of the side. Latvia 
behaved in this situation differently because preventing Germany from military actions was 
a top priority. Latvian envoy in Berlin reported that expansion of Germany is no security 
guarantor to Lithuania and other Baltic states. 161  
Latvians considered Germany as unpredictable partner and had no confidence in their actions. 
They were suspicious about the information on the situation in Klaipėda given by Germans 
and treated it with reservations. After German diplomat W. von Grundherr complained about 
violent rule of Lithuanians in Klaipėda, Latvian envoy in Berlin E. Krieviņš treated this 
information carefully. The initial task for him was to understand where was actually the truth 
told and where was W. von Grundherr telling a fiction. E. Krieviņš had an impression that 
the situation was prepared for seizure of Klaipėda by Germans.162 From envoy’s point of 
view, Klaipėda became a powder-keg and everything had been already decided. It could be 
that E. Krieviņš had reliable sources in Berlin while at the time he wrote the report Germany 
had already prepared the plan. Latvia was only left to speculate what would be Germany’s 
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tactics. Latvian general consulate in Klaipėda was afraid of secret Polish-German pact in 
which both countries would solve their disagreements at the expense of their Eastern 
neighbours. It was speculated that the plan would envisage liquidation of the Polish corridor. 
Germany could occupy Lithuania and Latvian Courland until the river Daugava. After that 
Germany would give Klaipėda and Liepaja to Poland in return getting Polish corridor.163 
When there was a couple of months left until the seizure of Klaipėda, L. Sēja announced that 
Lithuania received alarming information from the Nazi party about their preparations of 
Anschluss. He also added Heimatsdienst164 agitated every evening against Lithuania and 
lately Latvia had been mentioned too.165  
Latvia was also concerned about Lithuania’s actions. Latvians instructed Lithuanians what 
should be done in Klaipėda. In the conversation with Lithuanian representatives V. Munters 
suggested ending the court process of Nazis as soon as possible so that the impression in 
Europe would be stronger. He believed European countries were on Lithuania’s side but the 
longer the process took the more it lost urgency. Secondly, V. Munters restrained Lithuanians 
from any pressure on local citizens who could easily turn to Germany’s side. He assumed it 
could also give a chance for Germany to cause alarm that the signatory states are incapable 
of handling Klaipėda statute. V. Munters was concerned that Lithuania makes out of Klaipėda 
enormous problem on the international arena but there would be no chances of getting 
international help. The best solution was to keep status quo of the positions that Lithuania 
had. If Klaipėda statute was revised in this case, the situation could exacerbate because 
signatory states would put on Lithuania duties or in the worst-case scenario Germany would 
get the rights to have saying just like other signatory states. According to V. Munters, in this 
case Klaipėda would become a second eternal problem just like Vilnius.166  
Lithuania agreed to the most of those advices but they expected more from Latvia than a few 
pieces of advice.  The cooperation and support were only provided on diplomatic level. When 
the situation sharpened in 1935 Munters probably did not want to undertake any actions that 
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would signal military readiness. He told that a military aid in Klaipėda was not possible 
because military plans were not coordinated and it also required approval of Estonia. 
Demonstrative action was also excluded while Latvia did not have a common border with 
Germany. V. Munters suggested assembling military headquarters for consultation. He was 
also ready to make démarche to the German government but admitted it would expose 
weaknesses of Lithuania to which envoy V. Vileišis agreed.167 There is no ground not to 
doubt V. Munters’ honesty. It is the fact that the cooperation had not reached military fields, 
therefore any “hard power” actions were excluded. He kindly offered other demonstrative 
measures and V. Vileišis appeared to be satisfied with all that. Another Latvian diplomat that 
provided his help by giving advices was L. Sēja. He was not sure whether Lithuania could 
proof to the court in the Hague or Geneva that Germany systematically interfered in Klaipėda 
things.  “Even though Lithuanians possess enough material to proof that, it could not succeed 
in judicial arguments in the court because Lithuania would not be able to argue that 
illegitimate directory ruled in Klaipėda for a year” – said L. Sēja.168 Latvians stressed 
legitimate side of actions in Klaipėda while Lithuania sometimes mistakenly interpreted the 
statute. Latvia knew on that depended how the signatory states treated Lithuania. So far, they 
treated Lithuania fairly, denying Germany’s interference but there was a fear to lose this 
privilege.  
But the situation in Klaipėda was much more complicated and even Latvian diplomats could 
not agree on united policy. Two envoys residing in Lithuania and Estonia had relatively 
different point of views. L. Sēja who resided in Lithuania was certain R. Liepiņš’ assessment 
of the situation in Klaipėda was incorrect. He denied R. Liepiņš’ statements that German 
division relocated next to Lithuania was retaliation against regrouping Lithuanian troops. L. 
Sēja clearly emphasized that Germans were first to provoke it. Though he mentioned that 
Lithuanians were in no way perfectly dealing with the situation and he made sure to give a 
note on that to Lithuanians. However, the envoy in Lithuania avoided interventions as such 
because it would be badly perceived by Lithuanians. 169 Even diplomats were confused by 
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rapidly changing situation in Klaipėda. In 1934-1938 Lithuanian-German relations were as a 
roller-coaster. It was not always clear who would cause problems and deterioration of 
relationship.  
Slowly Latvia sensed that Klaipėda slips out of Lithuanian hands. L. Sēja described the 
situation in Klaipėda as a bitter fight. To him German aim was clear – to separate Klaipėda 
from Lithuania. He was surprised by how Lithuanians neglected to express tougher position. 
Lithuanians acted as if they forgot that Germany did not possess equal rights as the signatory 
states. He had a feeling that Lithuania set softer terms in Klaipėda.170. It seemed that 
Lithuanians were not able anymore to realize the seriousness of situation. They downplayed 
the threat of Germany. When did this breakthrough happened? In 1934-1935 Lithuanians 
acted firmly and they were the first country to put Nazis behind bars due to their anti-state 
activities. In 1934 Latvian envoy praised Lithuanians for their bravery not being frightened 
to face German anger. The envoy also admitted that they determinedly working on 
Lithuanization of this region despite being under very difficult conditions because Germans 
financed Klaipėda’s citizens very well.171 Gradual emergence of German power led to 
appeasement policy in Klaipėda. At the end of 1938 it was only left to conclude for L. Sēja 
that practically everything had been prepared “for the final solution of the question”. The 
only unsolved enigma was when would Germany give a starting shot to the local inhabitants 
and they would ask for Anschluss.172 In comparison to Latvians, Lithuanians were relatively 
disillusioned of what was happening in Klaipėda or at least the leading politicians did not 
foresee possible dangers. When Lithuanian prime minister gave an interview at the beginning 
of 1939, he claimed that in Klaipėda prevailed order and peace therefore there was no need 
to be concerned whereas L. Sēja had the opposite opinion. He thought prime minister’s 
statement was “comically optimistic”.173 He predicted nine requirements that Germany 
handed over to the Lithuanian government were just the beginning of a broader action in 
Klaipėda. 174  L. Sēja was struck by the government’s impotence and lack of long-term plans 
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or ideas what to do in Klaipėda. 175 It was not only Latvian diplomats depicting such grim 
perspectives in Klaipėda. For instance, Lithuanian diplomat J. Šaulys told to Latvian envoy 
E. Krieviņš that it would be better to forget about Klaipėda. He regretted investing 200 mln. 
in Klaipėda’s sea port.176 Latvians were discontent with such neglect of Lithuanians and 
because of that one could not expect anything from Latvians who were from time to time 
accused of interfering in domestic affairs. 
No matter how complicated situation was, Latvians sympathized with Lithuanians because 
their security was crucial for their security. In order to ensure their own security, the key 
issue was existence of the Baltic Entente. Latvian diplomats were realistic. They wanted to 
ensure these specific problems would not interfere in successful existence of Baltic Entente. 
Even though the best solution would be finding an ultimate solution of these problem, the 
minimum they expected from Lithuanians was keeping a status quo in Vilnius. Latvians 
understood sensitivity of this question to Lithuanians. They did not assume as the worst-case 
scenario to postpone solution of this problem. Latvians saw that the problem reached the 
deadlock and they feared the same would happen in Klaipėda. Those problems were 
interconnected in Latvian foreign policy and stability in Vilnius was depended on stability in 
Klaipėda. On a smaller scale, Latvia faced similar problems as Lithuania did. There were 
parts of Latvia that could be separated and given to other countries, there was a German 
minority that was not fully loyal to the Latvian state. Thus, the Baltic Entente was a natural 
security guarantor. Latvian press already in 1933 came forward with articles praising the 
Baltic Entente as the most effective way against the changing security situation in Europe 
after Nazis came into power.177 Latvia in no way wanted to challenge Klaipėda and infuriate 
Nazis but through diplomatic channels attempted to strengthen Lithuanian position.  
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3.2.1 Disclosing German threat: Latvian General Consulate in Klaipėda 
 
Even though Latvian diplomatic mission in Klaipėda had the status of consulate, its 
importance cannot be underestimated. The general consular J. Seskis was extremely 
experienced diplomat. At the moment he was appointed to this post, Klaipėda was not the 
easiest mission. Klaipėda had always attracted additional attention of diplomatic missions in 
Lithuania. J. Seskis himself noticed that Klaipėda was interesting to the diplomatic corpus 
residing in Lithuania. Representatives of great powers almost every time made their first trip 
to Klaipėda. Due to German propaganda the district became notorious in Europe. Klaipėda 
was in the similar situation comparable with the one in Czechoslovakia or Austria therefore 
an experienced diplomat who would tackle with tasks was needed.  
Lithuanians put a lot of hopes in the new chief of diplomatic mission in Klaipėda. They asked 
for a diplomat who could be named general consul because until 1934 only Germans had 
appointed general consul. Hence, he was the only who supervised the consular corps in 
Klaipėda. Lithuanians complained that it caused a lot of inconveniences under such tense 
relations between Lithuania and Germany.178 When J. Seskis arrived to Klaipėda he was 
received with all honours. He admitted that representatives of Lithuanian government many 
times expressed their gratitude of having not only German political representative but also 
Latvian.179 Very soon J. Seskis managed to live up expectations of Lithuanians. He provided 
diplomatic help dealing with honorary consulates. He always emphasized importance of 
Lithuanization. When honour consulates doubted what to do on 8th September180  J. Seskis 
reminded that they should be trustworthy Lithuanian citizens. According to him, it was 
probably first time when honour consuls raised Lithuanian flags.181 The appointment of J. 
Seskis and giving the status of general consulate had an important diplomatic and political 
benefit to Lithuanians. It was also a clear sign of support to Lithuania.  
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J. Seskis did not only engage in public diplomacy but also collected information about 
German anti-state activities in Klaipėda which formed position of the official Riga. He 
described situation as very grim. Local people organized marches with torches which 
reminded him the situation in Germany. He was outraged over Germans’ refusal to learn 
Lithuanian language. Between German and Lithuanian students constantly happened fights 
and more autonomic institutions did not select Klaipėda’s electoral college for Lithuanian 
presidential election showing that these elections did not interest them.182 J. Seskis noticed 
that Germany prevented Klaipėda from development and economic growth although 
Lithuanians put a lot of money in the sea port. According to him, the local government, 
controlled by Germans, used different methods to clung on power. He reported that there was 
a great shortage of flats in Klaipėda and renting prices are as high as in big European cities 
but local government did not do anything about that and postponed building of new living 
flats so the demographic situation would not change in favour of Lithuanians.183 Moreover 
the locals ripped apart Lithuanian flags, teared down monuments and there were initiative 
groups which agitated families to let kids to go to teach only German language. J. Seskis had 
no doubt that Germans are to blame but he was also not fully satisfied how Lithuanians dealt 
with the situation.  
He had a critical view of Lithuanians managing Klaipėda. It is noticeable in his reports that 
the situation exacerbated in Klaipėda. At first, he praised Lithuanians who by all means were 
resisting poisonous German actions and despite their differences in capacities Lithuanians 
managed to defend their prevalence successfully. 1934 December Seskis informed Riga that 
Lithuania was trying to break the domination of local Germans in Klaipėda which was very 
well financed by their compatriots in Germany. However, after a couple of years in service, 
he noticed Lithuania ceased to act strictly. 1938 July J. Seskis writes that court verdicts were 
shortened for Hitler supporters and thus Lithuanians lost authority among local Germans.184 
It should be reminded that before Lithuania had fiercely brought Nazis to justice. The most 
known case of that was Sass and Neumann court, also known as the first Nazi court process 
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184 Political life in Klaipėda district 1938 05 19 // LVVA. 2574.3.2197. p.49 
57 
 
in the world which took place in 1934-1935. There were also other Latvian officials who 
would express their surprise of Lithuania’s inactive role. Latvian envoy A. Bilmanis 
wondered how Lithuania did not cope with this problem so long. He told: “We made Riga 
Latvian so you can also make Klaipėda Lithuanian”.185 However, Lithuanians justified such 
situation with very strict convention that did not allow to tackle with the situation. 
 
Despite of situation being complicated and almost unchangeable, J. Seskis had a very clear 
vision what should be done against German propaganda. Due to his consular duties he could 
not express his thoughts but laid out his own opinions in reports. In general, he was critical 
to the policy that Lithuanians conducted in Klaipėda. He demanded revision of Klaipėda 
policy which was based until now only on condemnation of Hilter’s speeches. He stated that 
Lithuanization of Klaipėda had been delayed for a decade. Schools are taken over by Hilter 
support the whole district became a bastion of Hitlerism and so J.Seskis required a better 
national policy. According to him, considerable changes had to be done at schools which 
became Germans and cannot raise Lithuanian spirit 186 It was also essential to connect 
physically Kaunas to Klaipėda which meant building a railroad connection. J.Seskis wished 
that reconciliation with Poland would be prioritized. He blamed partially Lithuania fighting 
for Vilnius but morally and practically leaving Klaipėda for Germany.187 He was 
disappointed with Lithuanians who caused instability and political indecisiveness. He 
considered being a mistake suspending the martial law in Klaipėda. There was a threat that 
it would encourage Hitler’s supports “to stop only in Narva”.188   
Maybe J. Seskis might not have been such critical to Lithuanians and their policy in Klaipėda 
if he had not thought that something similar could not happen in Latvia. But he was convinced 
that events in Klaipėda could also influence Latvia. He realized that Klaipėda district is 
considered by Germans as a “bridge” to Eastern Europe and Baltic states. They could not put 
up with the fact that this “bridge” would be demolished.189 J. Seskis was aware that after 
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Klaipėda the next would be Latvia.190 He equated situation in Klaipėda with the events in 
Sudetenland. By his estimations, if the conflict in Klaipėda splashed, it could have long 
lasting consequences to all Baltic states. J. Seskis faced with the situation when Latvian 
teachers came to Klaipėda and Lithuanian teachers received them nicely but German families 
did not want to take up Latvian teachers because “the Latvian government oppressed their 
brothers in Latvia”.191 1938 December he predicted that Lithuania would become German 
vassal state and Klaipėda district with all its treaties would become the Trojan horse what 
would make Lithuania subjected to German influence. Moreover, he did not expect any world 
power to interfere and stand on Lithuania’s side. In his opinion, big countries did not pay any 
attention at factual economic cultural and political conditions. They did not want to 
understand that local Germans’ aim was to keep German cultural and political status quo. So, 
in the case of German take over Lithuanians and (because of fear to be invaded too) Latvians 
had to stand alone. Maybe because of this reason general J. Balodis was ready to station 
Latvian troops next to Lithuanian border when Germany threatened Lithuania.192  
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has dealt with the impact of territorial questions on Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian bilateral and multilateral relations. It was found that neither Latvia nor Estonia 
had known what was considered as specific problem before the discussions started. Vilnius 
question was the only specific problem envisioned in the treaty of the Baltic Entente. 
Klaipėda was not defined as specific problem. This reflected to behaviour of Latvia and 
Estonia although they handled with these problems depending on their own interests. 
Latvians provided help mostly through diplomatic channels whereas Estonians were much 
restrained despite the fact that in 1934 they seriously considered to support Lithuania’s case 
in Klaipėda. However, Klaipėda issue slowly turned into a specific problem. Lithuanians 
could not cope with German pressure. Latvians together with Estonians blamed partially 
Lithuania for making concessions to local Germans and concentrating on Vilnius.   
The main aim of Latvia’s foreign policy was a strong Baltic union. They advocated for 
solving specific problem. However, Latvians did not see it as an issue preventing from 
strengthening the Baltic Entente. Estonians were more categorical. They believed as long as 
specific problems existed the union cannot be real and lively. Specific problems raised 
mistrust to partners. J. Laidoner believed that drawing with closer to Lithuania could make 
Estonia defenceless against Soviet Union. Specific problems were the main reason why 
deeper integration did not happen but it is not clear at what extent it had an impact on 
choosing neutral policy and abandoning the Baltic cooperation.  
Estonia as well as Latvia were critical regarding Lithuania’s activities in Klaipėda. They were 
disappointed that Lithuania was incapable to deal effectively with the situation. But there 
were signs that Estonia and Latvia would have perceived the loss of Klaipėda as a threat to 
all Baltic states. Especially Latvia believed its own territorial integrity at some extent 
depended on the situation in Klaipėda. Estonian foreign policy shifted more to the idea that 
Lithuania’s disagreements with Germany put in danger Estonia. K. Selter attempts to mediate 
between Germany and Lithuania did not seem impartial but rather gave an impression that 
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Lithuania had to hand over Klaipėda to Germany. On the other hand, Estonian diplomats 
might have realized the inevitability of Klaipėda loss.  
Both countries kept neutral stance and called for reconciliation over Vilnius region. They left 
this question to Lithuania and Poland to settle. Despite diplomatic scandals, Estonia did not 
undermine Lithuania’s position. Similarly, the problem was treated by Latvia. However, they 
showed much more interest in reconciliation. Since 1934 V. Munters attempted to mediate 
in the conflict. Latvia took critical position of both sides. They did not succumb to Polish 
influence in order to push Lithuania to reconciliation. On the other hand, they harshly 
criticized their allies who made Vilnius problem a part of its domestic politics. Latvians were 
extremely interested in reconciliation because they believed Germany could use this conflict 
in order to invade not only Klaipėda but also Latvia.  
Latvians similarly like Lithuanians perceived “Drang nach Osten” policy as direct threat to 
them therefore the idea that Germany had an influence on Latvia was out of question. At first, 
Estonians stuck to a similar perception of Germany being a threat but later on there was 
noticeable growth of German-friendly powers in Estonian politics. However, no direct proofs 
were found to claim that Germany managed to influence Lithuanians through Estonia. 
Estonian partners were also suspicious about Estonia’s commitments to Poland. There were 
many sympathies for Poland especially in the military circles. Estonia’s behaviour sometimes 
gave a ground to believe that they consulted with the official Warsaw about Vilnius question. 
In reality, Estonians attempted to calm down and ensure Poles that good relations between 
Baltic states would be also positive for Poland.  
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